33

THE John
ART OF
LOGICK.

Gathered out of *Ariſtotle*,
and ſet in due forme, accor-
ding to his inſtructions, by *Pe-
ter Ramus*, Profeſſor of *Philoſo-
phy* and *Rhetorick* in *Paris*, and
there Martyred for the Goſpell
of the *Lord Ieſus*.

26

La Ramée, Pierre de 47 5 5

With a ſhort Expoſition of the Præ-
cepts, by which any one of indifferent
capacitie, may with a little paines,
attaine to ſome competent know-
ledge and vſe of that noble
and neceſſary Science.

Publiſhed for the Inſtruction of the vn-
learned, *by* ANTONY WOTTON.

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TO THE HONORABLE L. IAMES, *Viſcount Doncaſter.*

HONORABLE LORD;

IT is my deſire and purpoſe by this Treatiſe, to doe your moſt noble Grandfather the Lord *Denny*, ſome poore ſervice, by furthering your vertuous education. And whereby (except Religion) can that be more furthered, then by helping forward your *Lordſhips* perfection in the vſe of reaſon? It is that, which will enable you to judge of all Rules and Inſtructions in all matters, both great and ſmall: even in the managing of your horſe, in the vſe of your weapon, piece, and bow; yea, in the very comely cariage of your body. As for the knowledge of Arts, reading of Hiſtories, for Navigation, for Military affaires, for matters of State, it is not poſſible for any man to know of what vſe it is, but for him, that hath the vſe of it. If it be thought too hard for your *Lordſhips* tender yeares, let it be layd by for a time. In the meane while, the acquainting of your ſelfe with the termes of the art, will both breed delight, and præpare you for the matter it ſelfe. But I haue many times obſerv'd in your *Lordſhip* diverſe ſignes of more then ordinary capacitie; and therefore aſſure my ſelfe, that as *Virgill* ſayd of *Aſcanius*, your diſcretion and carriage are aboue your yeares. With this perſwaſion I make bold to dedicate this *Logick* to your *Lordſhip*, and vpon this ground humbly entreat and exhort you, to goe forward in thoſe noble courſes, wherein you are, to ſatisfie or rather paſſe the hope of your honourable father & grand-father; remembring thoſe Verſes, of the old *Britiſh Poet, Ioſeph* of *Exceſter*:

Ante annos, animumq; gerens, curamq; virilem. Æneid. lib. 9.

Mento caneſcant alij, nos mente; capillo,
Nos animo: facie, nos pectore. Tempora certe
Virtutẽ non prima negant, non vltima donãt.

Let others beards, our braines waxe gray and graue:
Their hairs, our harts: their looks, our minds be braue;
Both age may want: and youth may vertue haue.

The King of heaven encreaſe his graces in your *Lordſhip*, and ſanctifie all your noble parts, with the zeale of true Religion, and godlines, to your comfort here, and everlaſting happines hereafter in the Lord Ieſus Chriſt; to whoſe rich mercy I commend your good *Lordſhip*, and ſhall ever reſt

Deſirous to doe your Lordſhip *ſervice.*

Tower-hill.
May. 1.
1626.

ANTONY WOTTON.

¶ To the Reader.

I*N ſtead of a* Præface, *which (if it had pleaſed the* Lord *to giue me health and eaſe) I was purpoſed to haue ſet before this* Logicke, *concerning the vſe thereof; I muſt now content my ſelfe, and entreat thee* (Reader) *to be content with a ſhort Advertiſement of the occaſion and courſe of the buſineſſe.*

Now the occaſion was, the neceſſity I conceiv'd of perſwading men (if it may be) to enter into a more ſerious conſideration of truth; eſpecially in matters of Religion. I *obſerv'd, that true and ſound learning decayed daily; that froth of wit, and ſhew of reading, like a violent ſtreame, caryed all before them: that moſt men accounted of* Logick, *as* Ahab *did of* Micah: *Whom he could not abide, becauſe he would not ſooth him in his courſes, but tell him plainly and boldly, as the truth was.* Logick *will not ſuffer men to continue in errour, be it never ſo old and rooted, haue it never ſo many favourers and defenders. Therefore they, that loue the opinions, they haue long embraced, will not endure to ſee by* Logick, *that they haue bin miſtaken.*

Yet I perſwaded my ſelfe, that it might be, ſome would be willing to præferre truth before cuſtome, and rather to beſtow paines in weighing & trying, then take that which was counterfeit upon truſt with eaſe. This made me appoint my elder

der ſonne in Cambridge *to tranſlate this* Logick *(whereof I had found ſo good vſe by more then fortie yeares experience) into* English, *for the benefit of them that vnderſtand not the* Latin. *He accordingly diſpatcht the buſineſſe, and withall added many examples, eſpecially out of the Scripture, with which he knew people were generally beſt acquainted. The expoſition was taken (for the moſt part) out of certaine notes, which I delivered him in* Latin, *before his going to the Vniverſitie.*

They that will beſtow any indifferent paines, at ſpare houres, to read and compare the rules, examples, and expoſition together, ſhall find ſuch helpe for the diſcerning of truth from falſhood, as without tryall, they will not eaſily beleeue. If any thing ſeem not of vſe at the firſt, paſſe it over, & goe forward to that *which you may eaſily know how to make vſe of at the firſt ſight. I confeſſe, the former part touching arguments, is leſſe delightfull and eaſie: yet of ſuch neceſsitie to ſoundneſſe of iudgement, that without it our gueſſe will be very vncertaine.*

For all our knowledge ordinarily (except that, which we haue bred in vs by nature, or receiue by præſent ſenſe) ariſeth out of ſeverall Propoſitions: Whereof how ſhall we be able to iudge, if we vnderſtand not what reſpects things haue each to other? For example. Man is a liuing creature, endued with reaſon. In this propoſitiõ, or ſentence, I firſt enquire; whether it be true or no: ſecondly, what knowledge I attaine to thereby. Now for the former, how ſhall I know, whether this be true or no, that is, whether reaſon be truly attributed to man, or no; if I be ignorant, what arguments man *and* reaſon *are; that is, what reſpect theſe haue each to other? When I haue learned, that* reaſon *is the forme, and* man *the thing formed, I vnderſtand withall, that I know the very nature of man.*

Againe; When I heare that Man *is a* ſinner, *& haue found that* man *and* ſinne, *are* ſubject *&* adjunct, *I vnderſtand, that* ſin *is truely affirmed of* man, *and that the knowledge I haue of him thereby, is but onely of that, which is added to him beſides his nature: and that therefore this knowledge is vnperfect, and vnable to giue me true intelligence what man is.*

But ſome man perhaps will ſay: Can you know by Logick, *that* reaſon *is the forme,* ſinne *an* adjunct *of* man? *Not immediately, but as it were at the ſecond hand. I muſt enquire of naturall Philoſophy, how* reaſon *belongs to* man. *By that I am* *am taught, that* **Reaſon** *is that, by which* **man** *is* **man,** *and differeth from all other things whatſoever. This being found, I looke into* **Logick** *to ſee what agreement they haue together. There I am given to vnderſtand, that the one (as I ſignified before) is the forme, the other the thing formed; and that therefore, they agree abſolutely as cauſe and effect, and giue me the true knowledge of the nature of man.*

That **man** *is a* **ſinner,** *I am inform'd by Divinitie; and ſince* **reaſon** *and* **ſinne** *are not all one, I conclude, that this is not the forme of* **man** *: yea more, by applying the definition a cauſe to it, I perceiue it is no cauſe of him at all; becauſe he hath no part of his being by force of it: Therefore ſince it agrees to* **man,** *it muſt happen to him as an adiunct. It is then truly ſayd of* **man,** *but in a lower degree, then* reaſon *is, and ſo breeds more vnperfect knowledge of him.*

This I thought needfull to be ſet out by way of example, as ſhortly as well I could, that the vſe of Invention *(which in moſt* Logicks *is either omitted, or ſlightly handled) might appeare to be worth our labour and induſtry.*

Here I will reſt my ſelfe for this time, and commending the ſucceſſe of this matter to the good bleſsing of God, ever reſt

Thine in all good offices
of this kind,

Tower-hill,
May 2.
1626.

ANTONY WOTTON.

THE ART OF LOGICK,

written by *Peter Ramus.*

Chapter I.

What Logick is?

Præcept. 1.

[a] *Logick is an* [b] *Art of* [c] *reaſoning* [d] *well.* 2. *It is alſo called Dialectick:*

Expoſit.

[a] LOGICK] λόγος in Greeke ſignifieth reaſon; λογικός belonging to; or concerning reaſon: ſo that Logick is employed on reaſon. [b] *An Art*] By Art, I

meane, a frame as it were of præcepts or rules orderly ſet down, for inſtruction, in ſomething profitable or vſefull for mankind. [c] *Reaſoning*] Vſing reaſon, that is conſidering, debating, diſcourſing, diſputing, either with our ſelues, or with other: by ſpeaking, writing, meditating of any matter whatſoeuer. [d] *Well*] According as the true vſe of reaſon requires, we ſhould doe; whereas through ignorance wee many times miſtake, and reaſon otherwiſe then we ſhould. So then the ſumme of this is that, Logick is an orderly frame of rules, whereby we are taught, how to vſe reaſon (for the manner of reaſoning) as indeed it ought to be vſed. [e] *Dialectick*] Logick and Dialectick, are two names of the ſame thing. Logick is more common in Engliſh. Dialectick cõmeth from διαλέγεσθαι to reaſon.

CHAP. II.

Of the parts of Logick, and of the diuers kinds of arguments.

Præcept. 1. *There are* [a] *two* [b] *parts of Logick* { *Inuention,*
Iudgement.

[a] T*Wo*] Logick is the true picture of our naturall facultie in reaſoning: wherein we doe no more, but either conſider, what reſpect each ſeuerall thing hath to other, or joyne them together according to that reſpect; that wee may diſcerne betwixt truth and falſhood. So that the parts of Logick are two, and no more. [b] *Parts*] Theſe parts are as it were the members, whereof logick doth conſiſt, as a man doth of a ſoule and a body.

Præ. 2. [a] *Inuention is a* [b] *part of Logick; touching the finding out of arguments.*

Expoſit. [a] *Inuention*] To invent, of the Latine *inuenire* to find, is (ordinarily) to deuize, or find out by ſearching, and ſtudying. But this name is too skantie, and ſeemes only to conſcerne thoſe arguments which we call *third arguments, or middle termes*, See *lib*:2 *cap*. 9. [b] *Part of Logick*] Inuention and Iudgements agree in this generall, that they are both parts of Logick, as the ſoule, and the body are both parts of a man. [c] *Finding out*] This finding out muſt not be conceiued to be the deuiſing of arguments to proue ; but a declaring of the nature of ſeuerall arguments : Logick teacheth vs to find out arguments after a generall manner, by ſhewing vs the places, or heades whence we are to fetch the proofe, or declaration of a thing : and therefore this part of Logick, is called in Greeke by the Stoiks τοπικὴ, of τόπος a place.

There is no knowledge to be had of any thing, but by ſome argument of Logick. For whatſoeuer can proue or declare a thing, is either a cauſe, an effect, a ſubiect, or an adjunct ; &

ſo of the reſt. Now Logick teacheth what a cauſe, an effect, a ſubject, an adjunct is; what things are divers, what contray; what things in compariſon are equall, what vnequall, what greater, what leſſe, &c. And this it doth, onely by delivering generall rules.

An argument is [a] *that, which hath a* [b] *fitneſſe to* [c] *argue* [d] *ſomething.* Præ. 3.

Expoſit. [a] *That*] That what? will ſome man ſay. If you will, that thing. For I take that word thing in Engliſh to be as large; as τὸ ὂν καὶ μὴ ὂν, *ens & non ens*, in Greeke an Latine. [b] *A fitneſſe*] That is, which in its nature, doth declare, or make knowne. [c] *Argue*] Proue, declare, make knowne, ſet out; For ſome arguments, as ſimilitudes, haue no force to proue, but onely to declare, and ſet out a thing. [d] *Something*]. Several argumẽts proue or declare ſeverall things; every argument ſomething or other; what this, or that argueth, is to be learned in the particulars.

Præ 4. *Such are the* [a] *ſeverall* [b] *reſpects of things conſidered* [c] *alone and by* [d] *themſelues.*

Expoſit. [a] *Severall*] Not onely the middle termes, or third arguments, but every ſeverall reſpect, is an argument. [b] *Reſpects*] By reſpect I meane reference, or relation, that one hath to another As man referred to God, is an effect or creature ; in relation to the place he dwelleth in, an adjunct : in reſpect of the worke hee doth, a cauſe of wealth, poverty ; ſicknes, health a ſubiect. [c] *Alone*] Not coupled, or bound together in any propoſition. [d] *By themſelues*] It ſeemeth, this latter is put in to expound the former word Alone. Now that there may be ſuch a conſideration of arguments in Logick, it may appeare, by the like in Grammar ; where interpretation declareth the nature of nownes, verbs, adverbs, and conjunctions ſeverally : of which there is no vſe in ſpeech, but as they are joyned together in Syntaxe, or Conſtruction.

An argument is { *Artificiall,* — Præc. 5.
{ *Inartificiall.*

An [a] *artificiall argument, is that which argueth of it* [b] *ſelfe.* — 6.

[a] *Artificiall*] The termes are from *Ariſtotle* and *Quintilan*, but the ſignification is divers. [b] *Of it ſelfe*] By its owne nature: that hath in it ſelfe force to proue or declare. — Expoſit.

And it is Primitiue, or Deriuatiue. — Præc. 7.

Theſe termes are already in vſe, and knowne to Grammar Scholars. — Expoſit.

[a] *Primitiue, which is of it* [b] *ſelfe.* — Præc. 8.

[a] *Primitiue*] Of the Latine word *Primus*: Firſt, Primitiue arguments are firſt, both in nature, and order. [b] *Of it ſelfe*] which hath force to argue, not onely in it ſelfe, as all artificiall arguments haue, but alſo of it ſelfe; not of any other, whence it commeth. — Expoſit.

And it is { *Poſitiue,* — Præc. 9.
{ *Comparatiue.*

Theſe are alſo Grammar words, and therefore reteyned.

Præc. 10. [a] *Poſitiue, which is* [b] *ſimply and* [c] *abſolutely conſidered.*

Expoſit. [a] *Poſitiue*] Put or ſet; of the Latine *ponere.* Becauſe the poſitiue word, onely ſetteth downe, or delivereth the thing, without any adding of quantity : as *Good*, *Iuſt*, declare the quality of goodneſſe, or juſtice; but *Better*, *Iuſter* the comparatiues thereof, beſides the quality of goodnes or juſtice, conſider alſo the quantity, in compariſon of ſome other, that is leſſe good, or leſſe juſt. [b] *Simply*] Barely, without any addition whatſoever; as in the former example. [c] *Abſolutely*] From the Latine word *Abſolvere* to free, as it were freed from all other conſiderations; the word ſeemes to be added for the expounding of the former.

Præc. 11. *And it* [a] *is Conſentany or Diſſentany.*

Expoſit. [a] Every artificiall primitiue poſitiue argument is Conſentany, or Diſſentany.

A [a] *Conſentany argument is that, which agreeth with the thing it* [b] *argueth.* Præ. 12.

[a] *Conſentany*] Conſenting, of the Latine word *Conſentire*, to agree in the ſame ſenſe, feeling, vnderſtanding; generally to agree in whatſoever. [b] *It argueth*] Conſentany arguments declare a thing by agreeing with it, ſome way or other. Expoſit.

And it is Conſentany abſolutely, or after a ſort. Præc. 13.

There is full agreement betwixt ſome things, not ſo full betwixt other ſome; theſe agree abſolutely, theſe after a ſort. Expoſit.

Abſolutely; as the cauſe, and the effect. Præc. 14.

The cauſe and the effect agree without all exception, as you would ſay; not in ſome part reſpect onely; ſo that the one makes the other knowne Expoſit.

known as fully as may be; in a word abſolutely; of *Abſolvere* to make perfect.

CHAP. III.

Of the efficient cauſe, as it is procreant, or conſervant.

Præc. 1. *The* [a] *cauſe is* [b] *that, by* [c] *force whereof the* [d] *thing* [e] *is*

Expoſit. [a] THE *cauſe*] A cauſe, if wee ſay *The cauſe*, our meaning is, The argument called a cauſe, is that &c. [b] *That*] Giue me leaue once for all to ſignifie that whatſoever hath hitherto beene ſayd of an artificiall argument, all that belongeth to a cauſe: namely, *A cauſe is an argument*, which hath fitnes to argue, both in it ſelfe, as being artificiall, & of it ſelfe, as being Primitiue; and that poſitiuely, without being compared to any other; yea by way of agreement with that, it argueth; and ſuch agreement, as is abſolute and perfect, not after a ſort or by halues. [c] *By force*] That hath ſome hand in making the thing to be, whereof it is a cauſe. [d] *The thing*] The thing it argueth, proveth, or declareth. [e] *Is*] This word *Is*, doth not onely ſignifie the preſent being, but alſo belongeth to all times paſt, preſent, and to come; ſo that whatſoever already hath beene, is now in doing or making, ſhall hereafter be done or made, that is, was, ſhall be by vertue of the cauſe thereof.

Præc. 2. [a] *Therefore this firſt* [b] *place of Invention, is the* [c] *fountaine of all knowledge.*

Expoſit. [a] *Therefore*] Becauſe true knowledge is nothing elſe, but the underſtanding how, and by force of what, things come to be, or haue being. [b] *Firſt place.*] This head, or ſeat of arguments, which is the firſt in this part of *Logicke*, called *Invention*, is the fountaine of all knowledge. [c] *Fountaine*]

taine] Spring, whence knowledge doth flow; for nothing is knowne, as long as the cauſe is unknowne.

Præc. 3. ***And that is [a] thought to be knowne, the [b]cauſe whereof we underſtand.***

That the *Poet* had good reaſon to ſay. *Happie count we the man, that knowes all things by the cauſes.*

Expoſit. [a] *That is thought*] *Ramus* confirmes that he ſaid by the teſtimony of *Ariſtotle* and *Ovid.* [b] *The cauſe*] Then onely may we be truely ſaid to know a thing, when we underſtand what the cauſes be, by force wherof it hath being, or is.

Præc. 4. ***The cauſe is 1. Efficient, or matter. 2. forme or end.***

Expoſit. Here are two kindes of cauſes; but their nature is not ſo well knowne, that we can giue them any names.

Præc. 5. ***The [a] efficient is [b] that, [c]from which the [d] thing [e] is.***

Expoſit. [a] *Efficient.*] *Efficere* in Latine is to make, cauſe, bring to paſſe, effect, doe: from thence this firſt kinde of cauſe is called *efficient working*, becauſe all working and moving to the cauſing of a thing to be, is from the efficient, or him that worketh. [b] *That*] The efficient is that cauſe,&c. [c] *From which*]. The word *From* is as proper in our tongue, to the efficient, as either the Greeke *υπὸ*, or the Latine *A*. This came from God, that is, God was the Author of this. [d] *The thing*] To which it hath reference, or which it argueth. [e] *Is*] From the working, or moving whereof it hath being. The efficient cauſe then, is that kind of cauſe, which argueth the thing, as the Author of it.

Præc. 6. [a] ***Whereof though we [b] cannot find out true [c] kindes: yet may we obſerue [d] great varietie, according to the diverſe [e] manner of working.***

Expoſit. [a] *Whereof*] Of the efficient cauſe. [b] *We cannot*] *Ramus* doth not ſay that there are no true kindes of the efficient cauſe, but that we cannot find any. [c] *Kindes*] Of living creatures we find out the true kindes, or ſorts; that ſome are indued with reaſon, ſome are without reaſon; but we cannot doe the like in the efficient cauſe.

[d] *Great varietie*] All efficient cauſes are not alike; but we may finde ſome meanes of diſtinguiſhing, or making difference betwixt them.

[e] *Manner of working*] The difference we obſerue, is in the divers manner of working. Though all efficient cauſes make the thing, as the Authors of it, yet there is ſome diverſitie in their working.

Præc. 7. *Firſt the efficient cauſe* [a] *Begetteth or* [b] *maintaineth.*

Expoſit. [a] *Begetteth.*] Cauſeth or maketh to be; one kind of making to be, is put for all kindes whatſoeuer. [b] *Maintaineth*] Maketh that which is, to continue in being, and to grow. One manner then of working is, that the efficient worketh, by making things to be, or preſerving them in being.

Example. *In the beginning God created heaven and earth.* Gen. 1. 1.

Kings ſhall be thy nurſing fathers and Queenes thy nurſing mothers. Eſa. 49. 23.

So King *Henry* the 6. was the founder of the two Kings Colledges in *Cambridge* and *Eaton*; and all the Kings and Queenes of *England* ſince, haue beene preſervers, gardians, and maintainers of them.

No common wombe was fit me forth to bring,
But a faire virgin Prieſt child to a King;
No mortall father worthy was to breede me;
No humane milke was feirce enough to feed me.
Therefore the God of warre by wonder bred me,
And a ſhee Wolfe by no leſſe wonder fed me.
Daviſon. deviſ. 2. of Romulus.

So when thou ſeem'ſt fit for the cure of Art;
Let idleneſſe be wholly ſet a part.
This makes thee loue; this nurſeth ſweete deſire;
This is the food and fewell of that fire.
Shun idleneſſe, and broke lies Cupids bow, (*ſhow.*
His brands quencht out, nor heate, nor light doe
Ovid. de Remed. Amor. lib. 1.

In the firſt example; God was the effici- Expoſit.

efficient cauſe of the world, by cauſing it to be ; whereas before it was not. Kings and Queenes are the efficient cauſes of the Church ; by preſeruing and cauſing it to flouriſh.

King *Henry* the 6. was the efficient cauſe of the two Kings Colledges, by making them to be ; other Kings and Queenes ſince, by maintaining them in being.

Mars and *Ilia*, the father and mother of *Romulus* were efficient cauſes of him by procreation ; the ſhe-wolfe by nurſing. Idleneſſe is both the breeder, and nurſe of wanton luſt.

Chap. IIII.

Of the ſole and joynt efficient cauſes.

Præc. 1. *Secondly, the efficient worketh, either alone, or with other.*

Expoſit. This is a ſecond manner of working, w[illegible]the efficient worketh either alone, or with company.

I haue

Examp. *I haue troden the wine-preſſe alone; and of the people there was none with me.* Iſay. 63. 3. *And I looked and there was none to helpe; and I wondered, that there was none to uphold; therefore mine owne arme brought ſaluation vnto me, and my fury, it vpheld me.* verſ. 5.

1 This is applied by the fathers to our Saviour Chriſt, who wrought the Redemption of man-kind alone.

2 So *David* layeth the whole fault vpon himſelfe alone, and cleareth the people. *Loe I haue ſinned, and I haue done wickedly; but theſe ſheepe, what haue they done?* 2 Sam. 24. 17.

2 *David* alone ſinned; not the people.

3 *The band, and the Captaine, and the officers of the Iewes tooke Ieſus, and bound him.* Ioh. 18. 12.

All theſe together tooke Ieſus.

Præc. 2. *Of the cauſes that worke together, oftentimes one is the principall efficient, and the reſt are acceſſary as helpers, or ſervants.*

Examp. 1. *Iudas was guide to them that tooke Ieſus.*

Ieſus. Act. 1. 16. *Iudas* was the principall, the reſt, aſſiſtants or helpers. So the *Maiſter-workman*; ſo the *Generall* in an Army. Therefore *Ioab* ſent to *David to gather the reſt of the people together, and to come to take Rabbah, that it might be called after his name. And David gathered all the people together, and fought againſt it, and tooke it.* 2 Sam. 12. 28. 29. *David* was the *principall efficient*, the Souldiers *helpers*.

Præc. 3. *Inſtruments alſo and tooles are reckoned amongſt the helping cauſes.*

1 *Examp.* *Of his owne will begot he vs with the word of truth.* Iames. 1. 18. The principall efficient is God; the inſtrument the Word.

2 *David preuailed over the Philiſtim with a ſling and a ſtone.* 1 Sam. 17. 50. The principall *David*; the inſtruments a ſling and a ſtone.

By this argument the woman of *Samaria* concludeth, that our *Saviour* could not giue her the water of life. *Thou haſt nothing to draw with, and the Well is deepe; from whence then haſt thou this water of life.* Ioh. 4. 11. She thought the Lord Ieſus could not come by the water, for want of an hooke or cord.

* * *

Chap. V.

Of the efficient by it ſelfe, and by accident.

Thirdly, the efficient cauſe worketh of it ſelfe, or by accident. Præcept. 1.

THis is the third manner of working, when the efficient worketh of it ſelfe, or by accident. Expoſit.

That cauſe worketh [a] *of it ſelfe, which worketh by* [b] *its own power.* Præ. 2.

[a] *Of it ſelfe*] Not as a dead Inſtrument, which hath no power to moue it ſelfe to, or in working. [b] *Own power*] Abilitie or facultie, which it hath in it ſelfe. Expoſit.

Præc. 3. *Such are thoſe, which worke by [a] nature, or vpon deliberation.*

Expoſit. [a] *Nature*] A faculty naturall to them, or ariſing from their nature.

Examp. 1. So the winds blow. *There came a great winde from the Wilderneſſe, and ſmote the foure corners of the houſe that it fell.* Iob. 1. 19.

2 *The raine deſcended and the flouds came, and the winds blew, and beat vpon the houſe and it fell.* Mat. 7. 27.

An example of working vpon deliberation, is the perſecution of *Paul. I verily thought, that I ought to doe many things againſt the name of Ieſus: which thing alſo I did at Ieruſalem, and many of the Saints I ſhut vp in priſon.* Act. 26. 9. 10.

So *Balam* juſtifieth his beating of his Aſſe. *Num.* 22. 29. And *Ionah* his anger for the Gourd. *Ion.* 4. 9.

Præc. 4. *The cauſe worketh by [a] accident, when it worketh by ſome [b] outward power.*

Expoſit. [a] *Accident*] Chance, not by any naturall facultie, or vpon deliberation.

on. *Outward*] Some power, that is not within the ordering of the worker,

Of this kind are thoſe actions, which are done of neceßitie, or by hap. Of neceßitie; when the efficient is, as it were, forced to that, he doth. Præc. 5.

Without thy minde would I doe nothing, that it ſhould not be as it were of neceſſitie, but willingly. Philem. verſ. 14. Examp. 1.

If *Paul* had kept *Oneſimus*, without *Philemons* liking, he ſhould haue ſeemed to pardō him whether he would or no. Expoſit.

So it ſeemes to be in the caſe of ſin. 2 *I ſee another Law in my members, warring againſt the Law of my minde, and bringing me into captivitie, to the Law of ſinne.* Rom. 7. 23.

Such is the violence of our corruption, as if we were forced by it to ſin. To this belongeth the Decree of God; which implyes a neceſſitie of the event, though men doe, that they doe, wittingly and willingly.

3 *Notwithſtanding they hearkned not to the voyce of their father, becauſe the Lord would ſlay them.* 1 Sam. 2. 25.

They ſinned willingly; but it could not (in the event) fall out otherwiſe, becauſe the Lord had reſolved to ſlay them.

4 *Ought not Chriſt to haue ſuffered theſe things, and ſo to enter into his glory? Luke.* 24 26.

There was a neceſſitie, it could not be otherwiſe, but he muſt ſuffer.

5 *Not my will, but Fate did fetch*
Mee poore wretch,
Into this vnhappie errour.
Davii. paſto. 5.

The Shepheard would lay the fault of his inconſtancy vpon *deſtiny.*

Præc. 6. ***Fortune is a cauſe by accident, when ſomething hapneth beſides the intent of the efficient.***

1 *Examp.* *When a man goeth into the field with his neighbour to hew wood, & his hand fetcheth*

fetcheth a ſtroke with the Axe, to cut downe the tree, and the head ſlippeth from the helne, and lighteth vpon his neighbour that he dye, he ſhall flee to one of thoſe Citties and liue. Deut. 19. 5.

It was beſides his meaning to kill his neighbour.

2 So reaſoned *David* when *Shimei* curſed him. *It may be that the Lord will looke vpon mine affliction, and that he will requite good, for his curſing this day.* 2 Sam. 16. 12. *Shimeis* curſing may by accident proue a bleſſing vpon *David.* For *Shimei* intended not, that God ſhould bleſſe *David.*

Præc. 7. *Hitherto ignorance, and vnadviſedneſſe are to be referred.*

Examp. 1. *And now brethren I wot, that through ignorance you did it; as did alſo your Rulers.* Act. 3. 17. Ignorance is made the cauſe of their ſinne.

2 *But I obtained mercy; becauſe I did it ignorantly.* 1 Tim 1. 13. Ignorance is put for the cauſe of *Pauls* obteining pardon.

3 To this place alſo belongeth that

of *David*; *Remember not the ſinnes of my youth*, Pſal. 25. 7.

Ignorance and vnadviſedneſſe, are the cauſes that young men ſinne.

4 And that of the ſame King: *Lord take away the iniquitie of thy ſervant; for I haue done very fooliſhly*. 2 Sam. 24 10. *David* did vnaduiſedly in numbring the people.

Præc. 8. *Indeed the name of Fortune aroſe from the ignorance of the true cauſes of things. For when any thing falls out otherwiſe then wee looke for, it is commonly called Fortune.* So that *Iuvenall* ſayd very fitly.

Fortune hath Godhead none, where wiſdome ſwayes,
Wee fooles her Godhead to the skies doe raiſe.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Matter.

Præcept. 1. *The matter is the* [a] *cauſe,* [b] *of which the* [c] *thing is.*

[a] THe *cauſe*] It is a cauſe, for that the thing or effect is by force

of it. [b] *Of which*] The præpoſition(*of*) ſignifieth particularly, how the effect is by force of the matter; namely, as by that, wherof it is made; as an houſe is built of timber, ſtones, bricke, morter, and the like. [c] *The thing*] the effect, which is made of the matter.

Examp. 1. *The building of the wall thereof was Iaſper, and the Cittie was pure gold, like vnto cleare glaſſe. And the foundations of the wall of the Cittie were garniſhed with all manner of precious ſtones. &c. Revel.* 21. 18. 19. 20. 21. The matter of the wall and Cittie was Iaſper, gold, all manner of precious ſtones.

2 So the matter of the Tabernacle is deſcribed, *Gold, ſilver, and braſſe, and blew ſilke and purple, and ſcarlet, and fine linnen, and goats haire, and rams skins dyed red, and badgers skins, and Shittim wood.* Exod. 35. 6. 7. 8. The matter of the Tabernacle, Gold, ſilver, braſſe, &c.

3 King *Salomon* made himſelfe a Chariot of the wood of *Lebanon, He made the pillars thereof of ſilver, & the pavement thereof of gold, the hangings thereof*

of of purple. Song of *Salomon*, chap. 3. verſ. 9. 10. The wood of *Lebanon*, *ſilver*, *gold*, were the matter of *Salomons* Chariot.

Chap. VII.

Of the forme.

Præc. 1. [a] *Such is the firſt* [b] *kind of cauſes, conteining the efficient, and the matter; the* [c] *ſecond followeth, conſiſting of the forme, and the end.*

Expoſit. [a] SVch] As we haue declared, and ſet out by examples. [b] *Kind.*] The cauſes are divided into two kinds; whereof the former hath two branches, the *efficient*, the *matter*. [c] *Second*] The ſecond kind hath two alſo, the *forme*, and the *end*: and theſe two are the ſecond in order, becauſe the *efficient* and *matter* commonly goe before; the *forme*, and the *end* follow accompanying the effect.

Præc. 2. *The forme is the* [a] *cauſe*, [b] *by which the*

the thing is that, [c] which it is.

[a] *Cauſe*] Therefore the thing is by force of the forme. [b] *By which*] The præpoſition by ſhewing what kinde of force the *forme* hath in cauſing the effect. [c] *That which it is*] The thing is ſayd to be by its eſſence and exiſtence; but to be that, which it is, by the forme. A table, if we conſider the wood and matter of it, is no more a table, then a cupbord, a ſtoole, a beame, a poſt, or any other ſuch thing made of wood; but by the forme it hath, it is a table. Expoſit.

And [a] therefore by it, [b] one thing is [c] diſtinguiſhed from another. Præc. 3.

[a] *Therefore*] Becauſe the forme makes the thing to be that, which it is, therfore it ſheweth, wherein things truely, and eſſentiall differ, each from other. [b] *By it*] There are other difference; but the maine is by the forme. [c] *Diſtinguiſhed*] Made or declared to differ; from *diſtinguere* in Latine, to ſever, part, or divide a ſunder. Expoſit.

And

Præ. 4. *And the form is* [a] *bred* [b] *in the thing,* [c] *together with the thing it ſelfe.*

Expoſit. [a] *Bred*] That is, it hath its being, or is made to be. [b] *In the thing*] As that, which is ſo inward to the thing, that by it the thing is that, it is. [c] *Together*] So that, the one beginneth, as I may ſay, groweth, and is finiſhed with the other ; as ſoone as the wood hath the forme of a table, there is a table ; and as ſoone as there is a table, the wood hath the forme of a table.

Examp. *The reaſonable ſoule is the forme of man ; becauſe by it man is man, and is diſtinguiſhed from all other natures. So Geometricall figures haue their formes ; ſome being triangles, ſome quadrangles, ſome circles. So naturall things, as heauen, earth, trees, fiſhes, fowles, haue their ſeverall formes.*

Præc. 5. *Therfore when we declare any thing, we muſt declare it, according to the nature, or forme of it, if we can attaine to the knowledge thereof ; as in artificiall things we may more eaſily doe.*

He

Examp. 1. *He made alſo the houſe of the forreſt of Lebanon an hundred cubits long, and fiftie cubits broad, and thirtie cubits high, &c.* 1 Kings. 7. 2. 3 4 5. 6. The forme of the houſe is declared by the length, bredth, height, pillars, beames, three rankes of windowes, dores and poſts ſquare.

2 *Thou ſhalt make a Candleſticke of pure gold, of worke beaten out with the hammer ſhall the Candleſticke be made; his ſhaft, his branches, his boules, his knops, & his flowers ſhall be of the ſame, &c.* Exod. 25. 31. 32. 33. &c. The forme of the Candleſticke is ſet out by the ſeaven branches, knops, &c.

So forgiueneſſe of ſinnes is made the forme of juſtification; As *David declareth the bleſſedneſſe of a man vnto whom God imputeth righteouſneſſe without workes, &c.* Rom. 4. 6. 7. 8.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the end.

Præc. 1. *The* [a] *end is the* [b] *cauſe,* [c] *for which the thing is.*

Expoſit. [a] T*He end*] By end is not meant the vttermoſt terme, or being of a thing, as when we ſay the end of life; but the chiefe good, and as it were vſe, for which the thing is, and ſerveth; as all creatures are for mans vſe. The end is the laſt of the cauſes; and is called the perfection of the thing; not as the forme, which makes the thing to be that it is, but as a fruit of the forme, ariſing from the thing now conſtituted or made. It is ſaid to be the firſt in the intent of the efficient, becauſe, in his diſcourſe or purpoſe, it goes before the matter and the forme. For a man conſidereth, what the thing ſhall ſerue for, before he prepare matter to make it of, and deviſe the forme of it. The end of the motion or worke, whereby the thing is made, is the forme of the thing; or the effect; as the end of building is the form of the houſe, or the houſe it ſelfe : but the end of the houſe it ſelfe, or thing made by that motion, or worke, is fitneſſe for dwelling. There may alſo be a farther end of the workeman ; as deſire to ſhew his skill ; or to get profit by the thing. [b] *Cauſe*] Therefore the end hath ſome ſtrok in cauſing the thing to be. [c] *For which*] what ſtroke the end hath is noted by the particle *For.*

Examp. *Man is the end of naturall things, and God the end of man. For the creatures are for mans vſe, and man for Gods ſervice.*

All arts haue ſome chiefe good, and maine end ; as the end of Grammar is to ſpeake well : of Rhetoricke to plead well: of Logick to reaſon well. The end of the Sunne, Moone, and Starres was to giue light to the earth, and to diſtinguiſh the times, by daies, moneths yeares, *Gen.* 1. 14. *So God loved the world, that he gaue his onely begotten Sonne, that whoſoeuer beleeueth in him, ſhould not periſh, but haue everlaſting life. For God ſent not his Sonne into the world*

world to condemne the world, but that the world through him might be ſaved. Ioh. 3. 16. 17. The end, why God ſent his Son, was to ſaue the world.

Him, that knew not ſinne, God made ſinne for vs, that wee might be the righteouſneſſe of God in him. 2 Cor. 5. 21. The end of our Sauiour Chriſts Sacrifice, was our acquittall.

So the ends of *Marriage* are declared in the Booke of Common prayer; firſt, *the procreation of children*; ſecondly, *a remedie againſt ſinne*; thirdly, *the mutuall ſocietie, helpe, and comfort, that the one ought to haue of the other.*

CHAP. IX.

Of the effect.

Præc. 1. *The [a] effect is that, which [b] commeth of the cauſes.*

Expoſit. [a] Effect] From *efficere* to make, *effectum,* that which is made, or cauſed. It is generally taken for that, which proceedeth from, or hath being; by all the cauſes joyntly conſidered. [b] *Commeth*] Ariſeth of the cauſes, is made to be by the cauſes. Which is or hath being; From the efficient; Of the matter; By the forme; Fot the end. As man is from God, of the earth, by the reaſonable ſoule, for the ſervice of God.

Præc. 2.

Therefore whether a thing be [a] *made, or deſtroyed, or* [b] *after any ſort moved; this* [c] *motion, and the* [d] *thing cauſed by this motion is called the effect.*

Expoſit.

[a] *Made or deſtroyed*] Cauſed to be, or not to be; as when an houſe is built or pulled downe; both the building, and the pulling downe are effects. [b] *After any ſort*] Howſoever altered or ſtirred; as if a garment be changed in faſhion; if a tree be ſhaken by the wind. [c] *Motion*] Act of moving; as building, pulling downe, altering, ſtirring, by any meanes whatſoever. [d] *The thing cauſed*] As the act, ſo the thing done by that act:

the houſe that is built ; the garment that is altered, is an effect.

The cauſe is ſaid abſolutely to agree with the effect, becauſe there is betwixt them a cõmunion of eſſence, for the cauſe giveth eſſence or being to the effect.

The cauſe and the effect argue each other diverſly : the cauſe argueth or declareth the effect, by ſhewing how and why it is ; διότι, the effect argueth the cauſes, by ſhewing only that they are ὅτι.

Præc. 3. *From this* [a] *place of the effect, wee gather* [b] *prayſes and* [c] *diſprayſes, whereof both holy and profane bookes are full.*

Expoſit. [a] *Place*] From this head or place of *Logick* which we call the effect.

[b] *Prayſes*] The bookes of the Kings are full of examples : *Aſa did that, which was right in the eyes of the Lord, as did David his father, and he tooke away the Sodomites out of the land, and removed all the Idols, that his father had made, &c.* 1 Kings 15. 11. 12. 13.

So *Iehoſaphat.* 1 Kings. 18, 3.4. So *Ioſiah.* 2 Kings. 22.2.

[c] *Diſprayſes*] Such is that of *Baaſha. And he did evill in the ſight of the Lord, and walked in the way of Ieroboam, and in his ſinne, wherewith he made Iſrael ſinne.* 1 Kings.15.34. So *Ahab.* 1 Kings. 17.30.31. 32.&c. So *Iehu.* 2 Kings 10.31. So *Manaſſeh.* 2 King. 21.2.3.4. Doing that which was right, that which was evill, &c. are the effects of the good and bad Kings.

Præc. 4. *Hither are the ſayings and writings of men to be referred.*

Expoſit. The ſayings and writings of men are effects.

Præc 5. *By this argument Demoſthenes and Tully are commended for Oratory; Homer and Virgill for Poëtry.*

Expoſit. Eloquent Orations were the effects of *Demoſthenes*, and *Tully*; excellent Poëms of *Homer*, and *Virgill.*

Præc. 6. *To this place we referre the conſultations and deliberations of men,* *though they were never put in execution.*

Examp. *Parry and Lopez were traytors for purpoſing to kill Queene Elizabeth, though they never came ſo much as to attempt it. So Winter, Digby, Rookwood, Faux, and the reſt were iuſtly put to death for conſpiring and attempting that horrible and monſtrous gun-powder treaſon.* Their conſpiracy was an effect.

Præc. 7. *Vertues alſo and vices haue their effects.*

Expoſit. The true, proper, and formall effects of vices and vertues, are the fitting and enabling thoſe, in whom they are, to vertuous and vicious actions, according to their ſeverall natures: the vertuous and vicious actions are the effects of men ſo qualified. The effect of drunkenneſſe is ſet forth; *To whom is woe? to whom is rednesse of the eyes, &c.* Proverbs 23. 29. 30. &c. So Chap. 31. verſ. 4. 5.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of the Subject.

Præcept. 1.

Now follow the arguments, which are [a] conſentany after a ſort; [b] ſuch are the Subiect and Adiunct.

Expoſit.

[a] C*Onſentany*] Which agree with each other; yet not abſolutely, as the cauſe and the effect; but in ſome reſpect onely, ſo that there is here no communicating of eſſence. [b] *Such are*] Theſe conſentany arguments are the Subject, and Adjunct.

Præ. 2.

The [a] Subiect is [b] that, to which [c] ſomething is adioyned.

Expoſit.

[a] *Subiect*] *Subycere* to caſt or lay vnder; Subject, that which is caſt or laid vnder; vpon which ſomething as it were reſteth, or ſtayeth. [b] *That*] That conſentany argument, which hath reſpect to a thing, as that, on which the thing reſts, or to which it belongs. [c] *Something*] Which belongs not to the cauſing of it to be; that is, which is the part of the eſſence any way, but is added beſides the eſſence or be-

Præc. ing. *The ſoule is the ſubiect of knowledg,* Examp. *ignorance, vertue, vice; becauſe they belong to the ſoule; yet as no part of the eſſence or being thereof. So the body is the ſubiect of health, ſickneſſe, ſtrength, weakneſſe, beautie, deformitie: and theſe adiuncts are called inharent, or abiding* Expoſit. *in the ſubiect. Man is the ſubiect of riches, povertie, honour, diſgrace, of his* Expoſit. *apparell and company* : theſe adjuncts are called *externall*, or *outward*.

Examp. *The place is the ſubiect of things placed in it: So the Philoſophers attribute place to the divine ſubſtances: though indeed they haue neither parts, nor quantitie, or greatneſſe. So the Geometricians conſider place, and the differences thereof, in their Geometricall figures. So naturall Philoſophers much more diligently in naturall things; in the world, in the ſimple elements, and compound bodies.* So ſeverall places are alotted to ſeverall creatures.

In heaven the bleſſed Angels haue their being;
In hell the fiends appointed to damnation.
To men and beaſts earth yeelds firme habitation;
The wing'd Muſicians in the ayre are fleing.

With finnes the people gliding,
Of water haue the enioying:
In fire (all els deſtroying)
The Salamander finds a ſtrange abiding.
Davis: Od. 9.

After this manner ſenſible things are ſaid to be the ſubiects of the ſenſes; and thoſe things, about which vertues and vices are exerciſed, are the ſubiects of vertues and vices.

Colour is the ſubiect of ſight; ſound of hearing; becauſe thoſe ſenſes are employed in theſe ſenſible things. Vertues and vices are declared in Ethicks, or books of Morall Philoſophie, by this argument: as, temperancy and intemperancy by pleaſure; courage and cowardlineſſe by danger; liberalitie and couetouſneſſe by riches. This is commonly called the obiect. So things that be numbred are the ſubiect of Arithmetick; things that can be meaſured of Geometry. By this kind of argument doth our Lord ſtill the ſtrife amongſt his Diſciples, when they ſtroue which of them ſhould be the greateſt. *The Kings of the Gentiles exerciſe lordſhip over them,* *and they that exerciſe authoritie vpon them, are called benefactours; but yee ſhall not be ſo.* Luk. 22.25.26.

Expoſit. Our Saviour forbids them to ſtriue, becauſe there muſt be no ſuperioritie among them, which was the object of their ſtrife.

This argument *Propertius* ſetteth out thus;

The Mariners talke is of the winds,
the Plowmans of his oxe;
The Souldiers of his skars and wounds,
the Shepheards of his flocks.

Expoſit. So the winds are the object of the Mariners; oxen of the Ploughmen; skars and wounds of the Souldiers; ſheepe of the Shepheards.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Adjunct.

1 ***The*** [a] ***adiunct is*** [b] ***that, to which ſomething is*** [c] ***ſubiected.***

[a] A*Diunct*] That which is adjoyned, or added to a thing.

[b] *That*] That argument, which hath reſpect to the ſubject, as to that, which is ſubjected to it. [c] *Subiected*] Laid, caſt, or ſet vnder, of *ſubycere*; ſo that the adjunct is that, which is as it were laid vpon, or adjoyned to the ſubject.

2 *This argument, though it be* [a] *lighter then the ſubiect: yet it is more* [b] *copious, and* [c] *ordinary.*

Expoſit.

[a] *Lighter*] The adjunct is ſaid to be lighter then the ſubject; firſt, becauſe the ſubject is before it in nature; and is almoſt the reaſon of the adjuncts being; ſecondly, becauſe the ſubjects doe fully refute the adjuncts; for if you take away the ſubject, the adjuncts periſh withall. [b] *Copious*] Of *copia*, plentie; the adjunct is more plentifull; becauſe there is greater ſtore of adjuncts; many belonging to one ſubject. [c] *Ordinary*] More commonly vſed by vs in reaſoning; which perhaps ariſeth from the plentie of it.

3 Therefore we may ſay of them, as *Ovid*

Ovid doth of ſuch like.

Theſe things (for ſo they are) perchance may ſmall be reputed:

But ſuch as helpe not ſingly, doe ioyntly profit.

4 *All things* [a] *good or bad, which belong or happen to the ſoule, the body, or the whole man, are adiuncts of the ſoule, the body, the whole man.*

Expoſit. [a] *Good or bad*] As vice, vertue; proſperitie, adverſitie; health, ſickneſſe; riches, povertie.

5 *In a word, whatſoever doth* [a] *externally belong, or happen to any ſubiect, is an adiunct to it.*

[a] *Externally*] whether the thing it ſelfe be inward, or outward, if it be no part of the eſſence, it is an adjunct: as the facultie of ſpeaking is an adjunct to the nature of man.

6 *Now as the place is a ſubiect: ſo time is an adiunct, namely, the duration or continuance of things paſt,*

paſt, preſent, future, or to come.

To conclude, all qualities, that are added to any ſubiect, and are not the cauſes of it, are adiuncts to it. 7

Theſe qualities are proper or common. Thoſe are proper qualities, or proprieties, which belong to the whole ſubiect, to it alone and alwayes; as the facultie of laughing to every man, and to a man at all times; ſo neighing is proper to an horſe; barking to a dogge.

Thoſe are common qualities which are not in ſuch ſort proper; that is, which haue not theſe three properties, but want, at the leaſt, one of them. 8 Expoſit.

By this argument the Spouſe is deſcribed, *Cant.* 5. 10. 11 12. *My loue is white, ruddy; His head as the moſt fine gold; his locks are buſhy, and blacke as a Raven. His eyes are as the eyes of a Doue, by the rivers of waters, waſhed with milke and fitly ſet. His cheeks are as a bed of ſpices, and ſweete flowers; his lips like Lillies, &c.* *Examp.*

Expoſit. Here whitneſſe, ruddineſſe, ſweetneſſe are adjuncts.

Examp. *So a mans clothes, weapons, and company are his adiuncts*; as in the deſcription of *Goliah*. 1 Sam. 17.4.5.6.&c. *Then came a man named Goliah of Gath. He had a helmet of braſſe vpon his head; and a brigandine vpon him; and the weight of his brigandine was fiue thouſand ſhekels of braſſe, and he had bootes of braſſe vpon his legges, &c. and one bearing a ſheild went before him.*

8 *There is alſo great vſe of adiuncts in arguing the ſubiects, wherein they are imployed.*

Examp. *By this argument Plato proveth that, Thoſe Cities are in a miſerable eſtate which need many Phyſitians and Iudges, becauſe there muſt needs be much intemperancy and vniuſt dealing in them.*

Expoſit. The reaſon, for more plainneſſe lieth thus:

Where there is much intemperancy and vnjuſt dealing, thoſe cities are in a miſerable eſtate.

Where there neede many Phyſitians and Iudges, there is much intemperancy and vnjuſt dealing. For the vſe of Phyſitians is to cure diſeaſes, which ariſe for the moſt part of intemperancy; and the office of Iudges is to ſee that every man haue right, by redreſſing the wrongs, that are done or offered. Theſe are the ſubjects, or objects, with which Phyſitians and Iudges deale.

Thus haue we the category, or place, or head, of conſentany arguments declared; according to which one thing may be ſaid to agree with another: and Hitherto, as to their firſt & ſimple fountaines, all kinds of [a] unitie, or (that I may ſo ſpeake) of identitie are to be referred.

Exposit. Whatſoever may be ſaid in any kind to agree with another thing, or to be one and the ſame with it, is either a cauſe, or an effect, or a ſubject, or an adjunct. For there are no more meanes of agreement. [a] *Unitie*] being one; identitie, being the ſame, of *unus* one, and *idem* the ſame.

CHAP. XII.

Of arguments that are divers.

1 *Wee haue declared the nature of a primitiue conſentany argument; now followeth a [a] diſſentany; which diſſenteth from the thing it argueth.*

Expoſit. [a] D*iſſentany*] *Diſſentire* to diſagree, differ, diſſent in any matter whatſoever; as I ſaid of *Conſentany*, Chap. 2.

2 *Now diſſentany arguments are [a] of themſelues [b] alike manifeſt; and each of them is [c] argued alike by the other.*

Expoſit. [a] *Of themſelues*] Of their owne nature. [b] *Alike manifeſt*] For there is no difference of διότι and ὅτι, that, and why or how; as there is in conſentany arguments; becauſe the diſſentanies, that are declared each by other, haue the ſame name and definition; as one contrary is argued of another, one relate of another; not as in conſentanies; the cauſe by the effect, the ſubject by the adjunct: therefore he that knoweth the one, muſt alſo know the other. [c] *Argued alike*] Haue equall force to argue each other; neither can the one be argued by the other, as by that, which is better knowne, or hath more force to argue.

Yet they are made better knowne by their diſagreeing. 3

Expoſit. *Made better knowne*] If we conſider them together, the diſagreement we find betwixt them, maketh them both better knowne; as health and the benefits thereof; by ſickneſſe and the diſcommodities of it; ſo white by blacke, &c.

Diſſentany arguments are divers or oppoſite. 4

Divers are [a] *diſſentany arguments, which diſagree in* [b] *ſome reſpect onely.* 5

[a] *Diſ-*

Expoſit. [a] *Diſſentany*] As the cauſe and the effect were conſentany, ſo thoſe we call diverſe are diſſentany. [b] *In ſome Reſpect*] As conſentany arguments agree abſolutely or in ſome reſpect; ſo diſſentany diſagree; the lighter diſagreement is ſet in the former place, becauſe it is neerer to conſent. The reſpect, in which theſe arguments differ, is the diverſe vſing or conſidering of them, as ſhall appeare in the examples.

6. *Theſe arguments are commonly knowne by* [a] *theſe markes, Not this, but that. Although, yet.*

Expoſit. [a] *Theſe markes*] Theſe indeede, are the moſt common; but there are alſo ſome other now and then; and ſomtimes none at all.

Examp. *Not faire in beautie but ſweet in ſpeech was Vlyſſes.*

Expoſit. *Ovid: Vlyſſes* might haue been both faire and eloquent: but *Ovid* denieth the former, and affirmeth the latter.

Examp. *Stout Priamond, but not ſo ſtrong to ſtrike:*
Strong Diamond, but not ſo ſtout a Knight:

But Triamond was ſtout & ſtrong alike.
Faery Queen: book. 3. cant. 2.

Priamond and *Diamond* might haue beene ſtout and ſtrong alike, as *Triamond* was: but the *Poet* puts this difference betwixt them. Expoſit.

They haue a zeale of God, but not according to knowledge. The *Iewes* might haue had zeale, and that according to knowledge, as true Chriſtians haue; but the Holy Ghoſt telleth vs they wanted the latter. *Rom.* 10. 2. *Examp.* Expoſit.

Though I be rude in ſpeech, yet not in knowledge. 2 Cor. 11. 6. A man may be rude both in ſpeech and knowledge; but the *Apoſtle* denieth the latter of himſelfe, and ſo maketh them two divers. *Examp.* Expoſit.

Though I walke through the valley of the ſhadow of death, I will feare no evill. A man ſo walking may juſtly feare: but the Prophet ſaith he would not feare; Therefore in him to walke in the ſhadow of death, and to feare diſagree as divers things. *Pſalm.* 23. 4. *Examp.* Expoſit.

The vertuous man is free : though bound in chaines.
Though poore; content; though baniſht; yet no ſtranger.
Though ſicke; in health of minde; ſecure, in danger.
Daviſ: Can. 2.

Expoſit. Though the vertuous man be bound in chaines; yet is he free; though in danger, ſecure. Here free, and bound in chaines, are diverſe; ſo poore, and content, ſecure, and in danger.

Chap. XIII.

Of Oppoſits.

1 [a] *Oppoſits are* [b] *diſſentanies; which* [c] *wholy diſagree.*

Expoſit. [a] *Oppoſits*] *Oppoſita* of *opponere* to ſet againſt; ſo that theſe arguments are ſet againſt each other, and cannot agree. [b] *Diſſentanies*] Diſſenting arguments; which ſet forth or declare each other by diſagreeing. [c] *Wholy*] Not in ſome reſpect onely, as thoſe that are diverſe doe; but vtterly without poſſibilitie of agreement.

[a] *Therefore they cannot befall the* [b] *ſame ſubiect, in the ſame reſpect, the ſame part, and the ſame time.* 2

[a] *Therefore*] Becauſe they wholy diſagree. [b] *The ſame ſubiect*] The ſame ſingular party, or thing. Expoſit.

The three reſpects are plaine in the examples.

So [a] *Socrates cannot be blacke and white in the* [b] *ſame part of his body: father and ſonne of the ſame partie: ſicke and well at the ſame time. But he may be white in one part of his body, and blacke in another; the father of this child; the ſonne of that man: well to day, ſicke to morrow.* Examp.

[a] *Socrates*] This name is put for example; the thing is true of all men. [b] *The ſame part*] By part is not meant a whole member, arme, hand, finger; but every part of any of theſe, or the like. Where a blacke ſpot is, in the Expoſit.

very

very ſame place there cannot be a white alſo, though cloſe to it there may.

3 [a] *Therefore whenſoever one of theſe oppoſits, is affirmed, the other is* [b] *thereby denied.*

Expoſit. [a]*Therefore*] Becauſe they cannot both be together ; therefore if you ſay the one is here or there, you deny that the other is there. [b]*Thereby*] In thoſe Arguments, that wee call *Diverſe* ; if you affirme the one, you deny the other ; but not thereby. For when *Ovid* ſaid, that *Vlyſſes* was eloquent, he did not thereby deny that he was faire ; he might well enough haue beene eloquent and beautifull too. But in *Oppoſits*, if you ſay *Socrates* is ſicke, you cannot ſay he is well at the ſame inſtant, but by ſaying he is ſicke, you deny he is well.

4 *Oppoſits are Diſparats, or Contraries.*

Expoſit. [a]*Diſparats are* [b]*oppoſits,* [c]*one of which is* [d]*alike oppoſed to many.*

[a] *Diſparats*] *Diſparata* of *Diſpar* vnequall; when the one differs from the other; the word is ſomewhat generall; but we haue no fitter. [b] *Oppoſits*] Therfore they wholy diſagree, and cannot be joyned together. [c] *One of which*] Every one of which; for, as it is in the laſt word, they are more then two, and haue no certaine number. [d] *Alike*] Æqually, after the ſame manner of diſagreeing; as blacke differeth after the ſame manner, from yellow and from red, as being diſparate to each; though it differ not in like meaſure, from the mixture of the colours.

Examp. *Greene, aſhcolour, red, are middle colours, betwixt blacke and white, every one of which is in like manner oppoſed to both the extreames, blacke and white, and to the other middle colours. So liberalitie and covetouſneſſe diſſent, as diſparats, from each other. So a man, a tree, a ſtone, and innumerable ſuch things are diſparats; neither can the ſame thing be a man, a tree, a ſtone.*

It is the voyce of a God, and not of a man. Act. 12.22.

Some ſay that, thou art Iohn the Baptiſt; ſome Elias, and other, Ieremias, or one of the Prophets; but thou art Chriſt the ſonne of the living God. Math. 16. 14. 16.

Iohn Baptiſt, Elias, and *Chriſt*, differ as *Diſparats*, the one from the other.

So differ ſilver, and gold, and corruptible things from the precious bloud of Chriſt. 1 *Pet.* 1. 18. *You were not redeemed from your vaine converſation, with corruptible things, as ſilver & gold, but with the precious bloud of Chriſt.*

* * *

CHAP. XIIII.

Of Contraries.

1 *Contraries are* [a] *oppoſits, whereof* [b] *one is oppoſed to* [c] *one onely.*

Expoſit. [a] *Oppoſits*] Therefore whatſoever hath beene ſaid hitherto of *oppoſits* in generall, muſt be vnderſtood of *contraries* alſo. [b] *One to one*] Not one to many, as in *diſparats*; therefore in *Contraries*, there is greater oppoſition, and more diſagreement. [c] *One onely*] One of the ſame kinde; for it may be oppoſed to divers of ſeverall kinds: as, He that ſeeth is oppoſed to that, which ſeeth not; and to him, that is blind.

Contraries are affirmatiue or Negatiue. 2

Affirmatiue, when both affirme ſomewhat; as Relatiues or Adverſatiues. 3

[a]*Relatiues are* [b]*cōtraries affirming; the one whereof* [c] *conſiſts by the* [d] *mutuall relation to the other.* 4

[a] *Relatiues*] They are commonly called *Relats*; I keepe the word, which is already knowne, and vſed in Grammar. Both come of *Referor* to be referred, or to haue reference to. [b] *Contraries affirming*] Though they be contrary either to other; yet both of them affirme ſomewhat; as Father and Sonne; neither of them deny; as ſeing, and not ſeing doe. Expoſit.

[c] *Conſiſts*] Hath its being or nature. [d] *Mutuall relation*] Interchangeable reference; either being referred to other; as the ſonne is the fathers ſon; and the father is the ſonnes father; Having a ſervant maketh a maiſter; and having a maiſter maketh a ſervant.

5 Expoſit. *And thence are they called Relatiues.* Namely, of that mutuall relation. As a father is he, which hath a ſonne; and a ſonne is he, which hath a father.

6 *And becauſe of* [a] *this mutuall relation, Relatiues are ſaid to be together in nature: ſo that he, which* [b] *perfectly knowes the one, knowes the other alſo.*

Expoſit. [a] *This mutuall.*] For by reaſon of this, each is cauſe of being to the other. [b] *Perfectly knowes*] He that knowes, what it is, to be a father, knowes alſo what it is, to be a ſonne: and contrariwiſe.

Examp. *And it ſhall be as with the people, ſo with the Prieſt; as with the ſervant, ſo with*

with the maiſter ; as with the maid, ſo with the miſtris ; as with the buyer, ſo with the ſeller ; as with the lender, ſo with the borrower ; as with the taker of vſury, ſo with the giver of vſury to him. Eſay. 24. 1. 2. Prieſt and people ; Maiſter and ſervant ; Miſtris & maid, &c. are relatiues.

They gave him a peice of broyled fiſh, and an hony combe, and he tooke it. Luk. 24. 42. Here they gaue, and he tooke, are relatiues.

Betwixt Prince and ſubiect, there is as neceſſary a relation, as betwixt father and Sonne ; and as there is no man a father, but to his child ; ſo is none a Prince, but to his owne ſubiects. Sr Phil: Sid: Arcad. lib. 5.

Father and ſonne, Prince and ſubject, are relatiues.

So to rule & to obey. *Daviſ: can.* 32.

For where deſire doth beare the ſway,
The heart muſt rule ; the head obey.

So brother and brother, children and parents. *The brother ſhall deliver vp the brother to death, and the father* *the child, and the children ſhall riſe vp againſt their parents.* Mat. 10. 27.

7 *But an argument of* [a] *ſuch relation hath no* [b] *contrarietie in it; nay it argueth* [c] *mutuall cauſes; as I am your father; therefore you are my ſonne.*

Expoſit. [a] *Of ſuch Relation.*] Where Relatiues ſo argue, or declare each other. [b] *No contrarietie*] There is no contrarietie at all betwixt them. [c] *Mutuall cauſes*] They argue each other, as the cauſes each of other.

8 *But when I ſay; I am your father; therefore am I not your ſonne: then are they* [a] *contraries indeed.*

Expoſit. [a] *Contraries*] For the ſame partie cannot be father, and ſonne of the ſame partie; becauſe Relatiues thus conſidered are Oppoſits.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

Of Adverſatiues.

1 [a] *Adverſatiues are contraries affirming, which are [b] alwayes [c] directly oppoſite each to other.*

Expoſit. [a] ADverſatiues] Theſe are commonly termed *contraries*; but it is manifeſt, that there are diverſe *contraries*, beſide theſe: this name is alſo knowne and vſed in Grammar. [b] *Alwayes*] It ſeemes to ſignifie abſolutely. [c] *Directly*] As two pillars, that are ſet right againſt each other in a building; ſo that if you bring them together, you pull the houſe on your head, with *Sampſon.*

Examp. *Warre yeelds no ſafetie, 'tis peace we heartily ſue for.* Vir. Æp. 11.

There is a time to plant, and a time to plucke vp that which is planted; a time to breake downe, and a time to build vp; a time to caſt away ſtones, and a time to gather ſtones together; a time to get, and a time to looſe; a time to loue, and a time to hate; a time of warre, and a time of peace.

peace. Eccleſ. 3. 2. 3. 4. 5. &c.

Woe be to all them, that call good evill, and evill good. Iſai. 5. 20.

Which iuſtifie the wicked for reward, and take away the righteouſneſſe of the righteous from him. Iſay. 5. 23.

Yee cannot ſerue God and Mammon. Mat. 6. 24.

So libertie and freedome are oppoſed in that Proverbiall rime.

Better it is a poore houſe to hold,
Then to lye in priſon with fetters of gold.

Chap. XVI.

Of Contradictories.

1 *Negatiue contraries are [a] they, whereof the one affirmes, the other denieth, the [b] ſame thing.*

Expoſit. [a] THey] Thoſe arguments. [b] *The ſame thing*] For if the one affirme one thing, and the other deny another thing, and not the ſame, what gaineſaying is there?

Negatiue contraries, are Contradictories, or Priuatiues. 2

Contradictories are negatiue contraries, the one whereof denieth [a] *euery where; or generally.* Expoſit.

[a] *Euery where*] That is in all cauſes, matters, or ſubjects. As juſt, not juſt; a liuing creature, not a liuing creature. Is, Is not, are contradictories. *Iuſt not Iuſt*] Not juſt may be ſayd of any thing; as an horſe is not juſt; a ſtone is not a liuing creature; a Griffin is not; or, there is no Griffin.

Some beleeved the things that were ſpoken, and ſome beleeved not. Act. 28. 24. *Feſtus ſaid; Paul thou art beſides thy ſelfe. But he ſaid I am not mad.* Act. 26. 24. Beleeved & beleeved not are contradictories. So in the ſecond example; Beſides one ſelfe, and not mad. Examp.

CHAP.

Chap. XVII.

Of Privatiues.

1 *Privatiues are negatiue contraries, the one whereof denyes in [a] that ſubiect onely, wherein the affirmatiue is by [b] nature.*

Expoſit. [a] *That ſubiect*] Wee may ſay generally in that thing; but this word *ſubiect* ſignifieth, that they be adjuncts, which are affirmed and denied. [b] *Is by nature*] The contrary to that which is denyed doth naturally agree to the ſubject, or thing, whereof it is denyed; as blindneſſe is denied onely of thoſe things, which naturally haue ſight. Therefore a ſtone cannot be ſayd to be blind.

2 *And here, or in this head, or place, that which is affirmed, is called the [a] habit, that which is denyed, the [b] privation, or privatiue.*

Expoſit. [a] *Habit*] Of *habere* to haue; habit ſignifieth a qualitie, or facultie, which the thing hath, or might haue. [b] *Privation*]

vation] Of *privare* to depriue or bereaue, of ſomthing which is or might be in the ſubject, whereof it is denyed. Privation, if we will keepe that word, muſt ſignifie, not the act of depriving, but the thing, which is wanting : as ſight in blindneſſe.

Examp.

So motion and reſt. *So Ieſus wearied with his Iourney, ſat thus on the Well.* Ioh. 4. 6. Iourneying and ſitting ſtill are privatiues. Sight and blindneſſe. Hearing and deafeneſſe.

What els but blind is he, that nothing ſees
But deafe, that cannot heare.
Daviſ: Madrig. 19.

So riches and povertie. *Thou ſayſt I am rich, and encreaſed with goods, and haue neede of nothing ; and knoweſt not, that thou art wretched, and miſerable, and poore.* Revel. 3. 17.

So death, and life. *In that he died, he died vnto ſinne once ; but in that he liveth, he liveth vnto God.* Rom. 6. 10.

Speech and ſilence. *I was dumbe with ſilence, I held my peace even from good;*

good; while I was muſing the fire burnt; then ſpake I with my tongue. Pſal.29.2.

3 *Thus haue I declared the Category, head or place, of Diſſentany arguments; from whence all* [a] *difference, that can be of any one thing from another, is to be fetched.*

Expoſit. [a] *All difference*] Whatſoever difference can reaſonably be imagined betwixt or among things, is to be found in ſome one of theſe *Diſſentanies.*

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Equalls.

1 *Hitherto wee haue declared the nature of poſitiue arguments, both conſentanies, and diſſentanies.*

2 *Comparatiue arguments, are thoſe arguments, which are compared together.*

3 *Although comparatiue arguments are equally known, the one as well*

as the other in reſpect of [a] *compariſon; yet the one of them may be better known, and evident to ſome man, then the other.*

[a] *Compariſon*] For compariſon onely maketh them equall, or vnequall, like, or vnlike. Expoſit.

Many times they are briefly ſignified by certaine markes. 4

Sometime they are ſet out at large, by their parts; which are called [a] *Propoſition and Reddition.* 5

[a] *Propoſition*] Becauſe this word is of neceſſary vſe, in the ſecond part of *Logicke*, I would gladly ſpare it in this place, if I could tell how to ſupply the want of it handſomely; perhaps we might call the one, the *Declarer*; the other, the *Declared.* Expoſit.

Compariſons, though they be [a] *fained, doe argue, and* [b] *breed beliefe.* 6

[a] *Be fained*] The declarer, or former part may be a thing, that hath no true being, as diverſe cōpariſons brought Expoſit.

from ſtones, and plants imagined. [b] *Breed beliefe*] Declare and make knowne the thing wee handle, yea cauſe vs to beleeue that it is, as the compariſon ſignifieth.

7 *Compariſon is in Quantitie or Qualitie.*

Expoſit. Things are compared in reſpect of their quantitie or qualitie.

8 *Quantitie is that, by which things compared are ſaid to be ſo great, or ſo little.*

Expoſit. Quantitie, in *Logicke*, ſignifies not onely height, bredth, thickneſſe; but alſo all kinde of things; wherein one thing may be conceived to be equall or vnequall to another.

9 *Compariſon in quantity is of things Equall, or vnequall.*

10 *Thoſe things are equall, which haue the ſame quantitie.*

11 *Therefore an argument of equalitie is, when a thing is declared by that which is equall to it.*

The ſignes and markes of equalitie, are one. 12

Both the Cherubs were of one meaſure, and one ſize. 1 Kings. 6. 25. Examp. 1.

Æquall. *Theſe laſt haue wrought but one houre, and thou haſt made them equall to vs.* Mat. 20. 12. 2

As much. *Sinners lend to ſinners, to receiue as much againe.* Luk. 6. 34. 3

As, as. *The length of the Citie is as large, as the bredth.* Rev. 21. 16. 4

Deniall of inequalitie. *If Balak* 5
would giue me his houſe full of ſilver and 1
gold, I cannot goe beyond the word of the Lord my God, to doe leſſe or more. Numb. 22. 18.

I ſuppoſe I was not a whit behind the very chiefeſt Apoſtles. 2 Cor. 11. 5. 2

What is it, wherein yee were inferiour to other Churches? 2 Cor. 12. 13.

Sometime the propoſition, and reddition are diſtinctly ſet downe. 13

As is his part, that goeth downe to the battaile, ſo ſhall his part be, that tarieth by the ſtuffe. They ſhall part alike. 1 Sam. 30. 34. Examp.

How much ſhe hath glorified her ſelfe, and lived delitiouſly; ſo much torment, and ſorrow giue her. Rev. 18. 7.

As far, as the Eaſt is from the Weſt, ſo farre hath he removed our ſinnes from vs. As the heaven is high aboue earth, ſo great is his mercy toward them that feare him. Pſal. 103. 11.12.

Wiſedome excelleth folly, as far, as the light excelleth darkneſſe. Eccleſiaſt. 2. 13.

14 ***Sometimes the markes are left out.***

While loue in you did liue, I onely liu'd in you.
While you for me did burne, for you alone I burn'd,
While you did ſigh for me, for you I ſigh'd & mourn'd.
Davis: ſon. 2.

To this place belong thoſe [a]conſectaries; ſpringing indeede from contraries, but handled by compariſon of æqualitie.

Expoſit. [a] *Conſectaries*] Things that follow vpon each other; of the Latine *Conſectari* to follow.

When that thy Father thou doſt Maiſter call;
Thou doſt confeſſe thy ſelfe a ſlaue, and thrall.
Martial.

Maiſter or Lord and ſlaue are relatiues; yet here they are handled as æqualls: if he be thy Lord, thou art his ſlaue. Expoſit.

But this is more common in Adverſatiues; ſeeing they confeſſe, that there is force enough in naughtineſſe to make men vnhappie; muſt they not alſo yeeld, that there is the ſame force in goodneſſe to make men happie? Tuſc. Queſt. 5. *Examp.*

So, being provoked, ſometime we pay like for like. The Phariſes demaunded of our Lord Ieſus, by what authoritie he did thoſe things; He anſwers them; I will alſo aske you one thing: The Baptiſme of Iohn was it from heaven or of men? And they anſwered; Wee cannot tell. And he ſaid vnto them; Neither tell I you, by what authoritie I doe theſe things. Mat. 21. 23. &c. *Examp.*

An example of a compariſon of æqualitie, that is but fayned, we haue in *Daviſons Poëms* out of *Martiall.*

Why doe your wife and you ſo ill agree:
Since you in manners ſo well matched be?
Thou brazen fac'd; ſhe impudently bold,

Thou ſtill doſt brawle: ſhe evermore doth ſcold.
Thou ſeldome ſober art ; ſhe often drunke.
Dav: Epigram.

Chap. XIX.
Of the Greater.

1 *Vnequall things are thoſe, which haue not the ſame quantity whereof the one is* [a] *Greater, the other Leſſe.*

2 * [a] G*Reater*] In *Logicke* that is counted greater, which exceeds that, wherewith it is compared, in Greatneſſe, authoritie, power, excellency, number, or in any thing whatſoever.

3 *The* [a] *Greater is that, the* [b] *quantitie whereof doth* [c] *exceede.* *

Expoſit. * [a] *Greater*] In *Logicke*, &c. [b] *Quantitie.*] Of things vnequall, the one muſt needs be greater, the other leſſe. [c] *Exceed*] The quantitie of the other which is leſſe.

The

4 *The proper markes thereof are ſuch as theſe. Not onely, but alſo.*

Examp. *I am ready, not to be bound onely, but alſo to dye for the name of the Lord Ieſus.* Act. 21. 13.

Expoſit. The Apoſtle was diſſwaded from going to *Ieruſalem*, becauſe there he ſhould be bound for the Lord Ieſus. He ſheweth his willingneſſe to be bound, by the greater, his willingneſſe to dye for him.

Examp. Rather this then that. *I had rather be a dore-keeper in the houſe of my God, then dwell in the tents of wickedneſſe.* Pſal. 84. 10.

Expoſit. It is a greater happineſſe to be a dore-keeper in the Lords houſe, then to dwell in the tents of the wicked. The quantitie of that exceeds this.

Examp. More then. *The Lord loveth the gates of Sion more, then all the dwellings of Iacob.* Pſal. 82. 2.

Expoſit. The quantitie of his loue to *Sion* is greater.

Examp. Grammaticall compariſon. *To obey is better, then ſacrifice: and to hearken,* *then the fat of Rams.* 1 Sam.15.22.

Examp. Much more. *If when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Sonne, much more being reconciled, we ſhall be ſaved by his life.* Rom. 5. 6. 7.

Expoſit. The thing argued, is our being ſaved by the life of the Sonne of God; this is declared by the greater, our being reconciled when we were enemies; For the quantitie of loue in this exceedeth that in the other.

Examp. *He found no ſtedfaſtneſſe in his ſervants, and laid folly vpon his Angels; how much more on them, that dwell in houſes of clay.* Iob. 4. 18.

Expoſit. The thing argued, is the corruption of men, that which argues, is the imperfection of Angels; the argument is, the greater righteouſneſſe or perfection of the Angels, which exceeds the perfection of men.

Examp. *Two Kings ſtood not before him, how ſhall we ſtand?* 2 Kings. 10. 4.

Expoſit. The leſſe power of the *Samaritans* is argued by the greater power of two Kings, *Ioram*, and *Ahaziah*.

An example of a feined compariſon is that. *If the Prophet had bid thee doe ſome great thing, wouldeſt thou not haue done it? How much rather then, when he ſayth; Waſh and be cleane?* **Examp.**

Waſhing the leſſe, is argued by ſome greater thing, which it is conceived the Prophet might haue enjoyned. **Expoſit.**

* * *

CHAP. XX.

Of the Leſſe.

1 *The leſſe is that, the quantitie whereof is exceeded:* by that, which it argueth.

The markes, whereby it is knowne, are Grammaticall compariſon.

A Stone is heavie, and the ſand weightie; but a fooles wrath more heavie then them both. Prov. 27. 3. **Examp.**

A fooles wrath as the greater, is argued by the leſſe weight of ſand, and ſtone. **Expoſit.**

Examp. *Duſt is lighter then a feather:*
And the wind more light then either:
But a womans fickle wind,
More then feather, duſt, or wind.
Dav: diviſ: 3.

Expoſit. The lightneſſe of a fickle mind, exceeds the lightneſſe of wind, feather, and duſt. And is declared as the greater, by theſe which are leſſe.

Examp. More then. *I laboured more abundantly, then they all.* 1 Cor. 15. 10.

Expoſit. The Apoſtles greater labour is ſet out, by the leſſe labour of other.

Examp. *It is eaſier for a Camel to goe through the eye of a needle, then for a rich man to enter into the Kingdome of God.* Luk. 18. 25.

Expoſit. The hardneſſe for a rich man to enter into the kingdome of heaven, is ſet out by the leſse; as a Camels going through the eye of a needle; which is not ſo hard a thing.

Examp. Not like. *Salomon in all his glory was not like one of theſe.* Mat. 6. 29.

Expoſit. The greater glory of the Lilies, is declared by the leſse glory of *Salomon*.

Deniall

Examp. Deniall of æqualitie. *It ſhall be more tolerable for Sodom & Gomorrah in the day of Iudgement, then for that Citie.* Mat. 18. 15.

Expoſit. The greatneſse of the Cities puniſhment is ſhewed, by the leſse puniſhment of *Sodom* and *Gomorrah*.

Time waſteth yeares & moneths & dayes, & houres:
Time doth conſume fame, riches, wit, and ſtrength;
Time kills the greeneſt hearbs, and ſweeteſt flowers;
Time weares out youth, and beauties pride at length:
Yet ſhall not time vpon my heart prevaile:
Nor any time ſhall make my loue to faile.
Dav: ſon. 27.

Expoſit. The long continuance of his loue is manifeſted by the ſhort continuance of other things, as yeares, moneths, dayes, houres, fame, riches, &c.

Sometime the marke is left out.

Examp. *A garden encloſed is my ſiſter, my Spouſe; a ſpring ſhut vp; a fountaine ſealed.* Cantic. 4. 12.

Of this kind are Metaphors which alwayes containe a Similitude. As when God is termed a rocke: in reſpect of himſelfe, he is ſo termed, becauſe he is ſtrong, and vnmoueable as a rocke is: in regard of vs, that, he is a ſure defence, and ſhelter, as a rocke is.

4 *The parts of a ſimilitude are ſometime* [a] *laid out, at large; either ſevered, or ioyned.*

Expoſit. [a] *Laid out*] The former examples cloſe vp the ſimilitude in one word, or two; thoſe that follow, lay them open to our view.

5 *A diſtinct ſimilitude, or ſevered likeneſſe is, when there are foure* [a] *termes* [b] *diſtinctly ſet downe.*

Expoſit. [a] *Termes*] The parts of the propoſition and reddition are called termes: which ſhall be noted in the examples, [b] *Diſtinctly*] So that there be two in the propoſition; two other in the reddition.

Examp. *As the waxe melteth at the fire: ſo let the vngodly periſh at the preſence of God.* Pſal. 68. 2.

Expoſit. The thing argued is the periſhing of the vngodly, at the preſence of God; which is ſet downe in the reddition or latter part. The thing arguing is melting of waxe at the fire: delivered in the propoſition or former part. The parts or tearmes in the propoſition are, Waxe, Fire; in the reddition, vngodly, the preſence of God.

Examp. *As the Hart brayeth after the rivers of water; ſo panteth my ſoule after thee O God.* The foure termes are; the heart; the river; the ſoule; God. *Pſal.* 42. 1. Expoſit.

Examp. *As the body without breath is dead; ſo faith without workes is dead alſo. Iames.* 2. 26. The body, breath; faith; workes. Expoſit.

Sometime one of the markes is left out, and the parts diſplaced.

Examp. *Husbands loue your wiues; even as Chriſt loved the Church.*

Expoſit. The termes are, Chriſt, Church; Husbands; wiues; The reddition or latter part is ſet formoſt, the propoſition in the latter place. The ſimilitude orderly ſet downe runneth thus; *As Chriſt loved the Church, ſo muſt men loue their wiues.* Eph. 5.29.

Sometime both markes are left out.

Examp. *Silver, droſſe, overlaid upon a potſheard; burning lips, and an evill heart.* Pro. 26. 23.

Expoſit. Thus lies the likeneſſe; As a potſheard covered with ſilver; ſo are burning lips, and a wicked heart; both faire outwardly, within filthy. The foure termes are diſtinct. A potſheard, ſilver; burning lips, a wicked heart.

6 *A* [a] *ioyned or continued ſimilitude is, when the* [b] *ſecond terme is to the third, as the firſt is to the ſecond.*

Expoſit. [a] *Ioyned*] It is ſo called, becauſe the ſecond terme is continued in the reddition, in the third place; and not a ſeverall new terme, which was not in the propoſition. [b] *The ſecond*] There are but three termes in all; therefore one muſt be repeated; which is the ſecond; and that belongeth alike to the firſt, & to the third;

examples will make it plainer.

As the father hath loved me, ſo haue I loved you. Ioh. 15.9. Examp.

In this ſimilitude there are but three termes. The 1. father. 2. I. 3. you. I the ſecond terme is referred to you the third, as the father the firſt terme is to I the ſecond. Thus perhaps it will be eaſier. As God loved Chriſt, ſo Chriſt loved his Diſciples. Chriſt is ſo affected to his Diſciples; as God the Father is to Chriſt. Expoſit.

Sometimes here alſo one marke is omitted, and the parts diſplaced.

Oughteſt not thou to haue had pittie on thy fellow ſervant; as I had pittie on thee? Mat. 18.33. Examp.

The three termes are 1. I the Lord, 2. thou the ſervant, 3. thy fellow-ſervant. It is thus to be diſpoſed; As I the Lord had pittie on thee, ſo thou the ſervant ſhouldſt haue had pittie on thy fellow ſervant. The ſecond terme the ſervant, ſhould haue beene to the third terme his fellow ſervant, as the Lord the firſt terme, was to the ſervant the ſecond. Expoſit.

Fai-

Examp. *Fained ſimilitudes are of as much force to argue, as true; So Nathan dealt with David.* 2 Sam. 12. 1. 2. 7.

So the Prophet reprooved Ahab. 1 Kings. 20. 38. 39. 42.

In this kind *Æſops* fables excell; but far aboue them are the moſt excellent Parables, or likeneſſes of our Lord Ieſus; whereof the Goſpell is full. *Mat.* 13. 3. 24. 31. 33. *Luk.* 15. 4. 8. 11.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Vnlike.

1 *Vnlike things are thoſe, which haue a* [a] *diverſe qualitie.*

[a] D*iverſe qualitie*] Which differ from each other in qualitie.

2 *The proper notes of vnlikeneſſe are vnlike.*

1 *The fourth beaſt was vnlike to all the beaſts before it.* Dan. 7. 7. 19.

2 Another. *There is another glory of the Sunne, another of the Moone, and another of the Starres: For one Starre differeth*

fereth from another in glory. 1 Cor. 15. 41.

5 Deniall of likeneſſe is moſt common. *There is none like me in all the earth.* Exod. 9. 14.

Who is like vnto thee, O Lord, among the Gods? Exod. 15. 11.

4 Not as, ſo. *But not as the offence, ſo alſo is the gift.* Rom. 5. 15.

And not as it was by one that ſinned, ſo is the gift. Rom. 5. 16.

Many times there is no mark; and the vnlikeneſſe is fully ſet out; as in the *Epigram* of *Catullus.*

The Sun that ſets, againe ſhall riſe:
When our ſhort light once hidden lies.
Perpetuall night ſhall cloſe our eyes.

To which this may be oppoſed in the ſame kind of Compariſon.

The Sunne you ſee ſo often riſe,
You ſee as often leaue the skies.
But we, when one ſhort night is paſt,
Shall liue in light that aye ſhall laſt.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Conjugates.

1 *Hitherto we haue ſhewed the nature of primitiue arguments; now follow* [a] *Derivatiue.*

Expoſit. [a] D*Erivatiue*] Of *rivus* a river or brooke; *Derivatiues* as it were divers ſtreames drawne, or iſſuing from the ſame fountaine.

2 *Derivatiues haue the ſame force to argue, that the* [a] *Primitiues haue, from which they are derived.*

Expoſit. [a] *Primitiues*] Thoſe, that come of the cauſes, argue as the cauſes doe; thoſe, that are drawne from the ſubjects or adjuncts, haue the ſame force to declare that, they argue, which the ſubject and adjunct haue.

3 *Derivatiues are* 1. *Coniugates or Notation,* 2. *Diſtribution or Definition.*

Expoſit. Wee can find no more any true kinds of Derivatiues then we can of cauſes.

[a] Coniugates are [b] names diverſly derived from the ſame beginning. 4

Of the ſame theame, or roote.

[a] *Coniugates*] Of *coniungo* to joyne. Those that are joyned, as it were, by kindred; as, Iuſt, Iuſtice, Iuſtly. Expoſit.

[b] *Names*] That is, words; not nownes: for words, whether they be nownes, verbs, or adverbs; are names of the things, that they ſignifie: as Iuſt is the name of ſuch a man, or action: Iuſtice, the name of ſuch a habit, or qualitie: Iuſtly, the name of doing according to Iuſtice. Theſe words, and the like belong to Grammar; but it is *Logicke*, that teacheth vs to reaſon by them.

In Coniugates there is a marke of Conſentany arguments. 5

He that doth righteouſneſſe is righteous. 1 Ioh. 3. 7. *Examp.*

Here the cauſe is argued by the effect; a righteous man is the cauſe of righteous actions. Expoſit.

A good man out of the good treaſure of his heart, bringeth forth good things, and *Examp.*

and an evill man out of the evill treaſure evill things. Math. 12. 35.

Expoſit. A good heart is the cauſe of good things: an evill of evill.

Examp. *Thy lawfull wife faire Lelia needs muſt be,*
For ſhee was forc't by Law to marry thee.
Daviſ: Epigram.

Law maketh things lawfull.

Anſwere not a foole according to his folly. Prov. 26. 4.

A foole is the ſubject; folly the adjunct.

Here both arguments haue the ſame name: Conjugats.

CHAP. XXIIII.

Of Notation.

1 [a] *Notation is the* [b] *interpretation of a name*; or word.

Expoſit. [a] N*Otation*] Of *Nota*, a marke, marking out; that is, declaring whence the word is. [b] *Interpretation.*] It is that which in Greeke is called ἐτυμολογία, the true reaſon of the word, how it commeth to ſignifie this, or that.

There is no name of any thing, [a] *deriuatiue, or compound, but if it were* [b] *skilfully given, the reaſon of it may be drawn from* [c] *ſome primitiue argument.*

Expoſit. [a] *Derivatiue*] For primitiue words come from the will of man, who deviſeth names for things; as the Lord God himſelfe appointed the Hebrew primitiue words; from which derivatiues were framed by men, as occaſion offered it ſelfe. [b] *skilfully*] Many haue failed much in this skill; that it is (I thinke) impoſſible, to ſhew ſuch a reaſon of every derivatiue, and compound word. [c] *Some*] Either abſolute, or comparatiue.

Examp. From the cauſe. *She ſhall be called Woman, becauſe ſhe was taken out of man.* Gen. 2. 25.

From the Effect. *Thou ſhalt call his name Ieſus, Saviour, for he ſhall ſaue his people from their ſinnes.* Mat. 1. 21.

From the ſubject. We call men Divines, Lawyers, Phyſicians; becauſe of the object whereabout they are imployed; *viz.* Divinitie, Law, Phyſicke.

From the ſubject place is that of the *Poët.*

From Court, it ſeemes, men curteſie doe call,
For that it there moſt vſeth to abound.
Faer. Qu: book. 6. Cant. 9.

From the adjunct. *Thy name ſhall be Abraham; for a Father of many Nations haue I made thee.* Gen. 17. 5.

For *Abraham* in the Hebrew is the father of a multitude.

Nabal, foole, is his name, and folly, Nabalah, is with him. 1 Sam. 25. 25.

There is alſo notation from Diſſentanies.

Examp. *And from Comparatiues; as a kinde of hearbe is called a Mandrake, becauſe the roote of it reſembles the faſhion of a man.*

The [a] *name* [b] *argues the notation; as the Notation doth the name.*

[a] *Name*] In this place, or Category of *Logicke*, the arguments haue divers names; the one is called the name, the other the Notation. [b] *Argues*]

Proues, declares; the one is æqually, and alike argued by the other; As full of courage, therefore courageous. Here the notation declares the name. Courageous, therefore full of courage. Where the name argues the notation.

Chap. XXIIII.

Of Diſtribution.

There remaine now of Derivatiue arguments, Diſtribution and Definition. 1

In [a] *each whereof there is an* [b] *affection of* [c] *reciprocation.* 2

[a] *Each*] Both in Diſtribution and in Definition. [b] *Affection*] A fitneſſe, or proprenes to argue each other. [c] *Reciprocation*] *Reciprocare* is to returne thether whence we came; as the water doth, when it ebbs. Now by this, the mutuall or interchangeable arguing of the parts, is ſignified; **Expoſit.**

the particulars will make this better vnderſtood.

3 *In Diſtribution the reciprocation is betwixt the parts, and the whole.*

Expoſit. For all the parts, and the whole, being all one, (the whole is nothing but all the parts) as the whole argueth all the parts; ſo all the parts argue the whole; as being one and the ſame thing. Invention and Iudgement are nothing els but *Logicke*. A ſoule and a body are nothing els but a man. *Logicke* is nothing els but invention and judgement. A man is nothing els but a ſoule and a body. So each of theſe, the whole and the parts, returne into other.

4 [a] *Diſtribution is, when the whole is divided into parts.*

Expoſit. [a] *Diſtribution*] *Tribuere* to giue; *diſtribuere* to giue by parts, or peeces; diſtribution, dividing into parts; as it were giving the thing in parts.

5 *The whole is that, which* [a] *containeth parts.*

[a] *Containeth*] Hath parts, or conſiſts of parts; conteining doth not ſignifie here, keeping within it; as a veſſell doth containe liquor. **Expoſit.**

Whatſoever hath parts, is the, or a, whole.

6 *A part is that, which is conteined of the whole; as a peece thereof.*

7 *As the dividing of the whole into parts, is called Diſtribution; ſo the gathering of the parts together, to make vp the whole, is called Induction;* That is, bringing in, of *Inducere* to bring in. **Expoſit.**

Diſtribution, and Induction are all one; but that the former proceedeth from the whole to the parts; the latter from the parts to the whole.

8 *A Diſtribution is made of arguments, which agree with the whole, but diſagree one with another.*

Expoſit. Precepts of art, which propound diſtributions, muſt conſiſt of conſentany arguments, becauſe the whole, and the parts agree, as cauſe and effect,

fect, or effect and cauſe. But the parts conſidered one with another are diſſentanies: *Logicke*, and Invention, and Iudgement, are effect and cauſe. Invention and judgement are oppoſits, Adverſatiues.

9 *Therfore the Diſtribution is ſo much the more accurate, perfect, by how much greater, the agreement of the parts is with the whole, and the diſagreement of them one with another.*

Expoſit. Since the parts muſt be all one with the whole, the more they agree, the better is the thing diſtributed; and ſince the parts muſt diſagree among themſelues, the more they diſagree the rightlier they are made divers parts; as thoſe, that cannot be the ſame.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Diſtribution by the Cauſes.

The firſt Diſtribution, is by arguments abſolutely conſentany; that is, by the cauſes, and effects. 1

A diſtribution by or into the cauſes, is, when the parts are the [a] *cauſes of the whole.* 2

Expoſit. [a] C*Auſes.*] Thoſe cauſes whereof it conſiſts; or whereof the whole is made; as when *Logicke* is parted into Invention and Iudgement, Man into ſoule and body, Grammar into Etymologie and Syntaxe.

Here, that is in this kind of diſtribution, the diſtribution into the [a] *integrall and members is moſt commended.* 3

Expoſit. [a] *Integrall*] *Integrum* in Latine, the whole; but ſuch a whole, as is conſtituted or made by the parts, which are called members; wee might not vnfitly perhaps call it the body, which is made of the members: but the word is ſomewhat too particular.

4 *The integrall is the whole, to* [a] *which the parts are eſſentiall.*

Expoſit. To which the parts giue eſſence or being. As *Logicke* is nothing elſe, but Invention and Iudgement, by which it is conſtituted, or made to be: ſo, man is nothing, but ſoule and body. Therefore the members are, in order of nature, before the integrall; as the cauſe is conceived to be before the effect.

5 *A member is a part of the Integrall.* Such a part, as is eſſentiall to it; for every member containeth part of the matter; all together containe the forme alſo.

Examp. *So Grammar is divided into Etymologie and Syntaxe: Rhetoricke into Elocution, and Action: Logicke into Invention and Iudgement; for theſe arts are conſtituted or made of theſe parts.*

6 *This Diſtribution is chiefly vſed, when we haue ſome long diſcourſe*

to make, as in Orations and Sermons.

7 *This kind of argument is ſometimes otherwiſe handled: either from the parts to the whole; or from the whole to the parts.*

Some men count Iudith faire; I thinke not ſo;
For ſtreight, white, tall, I am content ſhee goe:
Theſe parts I grant the whole, faire, I deny,
Sweet, grace, and favour none in her I ſpie.
Mary is faire; all faire from top to toe;
Sweet, grace, and favour, in her onely flow.
Catullus.

Expoſit. Here the whole, faire, is denyed, becauſe ſome part, ſweete, grace, or favour, is wanting.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of diſtribution by the Effects, where of Genus and Species.

8 *Diſtribution by the effects is, when the parts are effects.*

Examp. *OF other Shepheards, ſome were running after their ſheepe ſtrayed* *beyond their bounds; ſome delighting their eyes with ſeeing them nibble vpon the ſhort, and ſweet graſſe; ſome medicining the ſicke ewes; ſome ſetting a bell for an enſigne of a ſheepiſh ſquadron; ſome, with more leaſure, deviſing new games of exercising their bodies, and delighting their minds.* Arcad.lib.1.

Expoſit. The Shepheards are here divided by their effects, running, looking, medicining, &c.

2 *Of all diſtributions of* [a] *this kinde, that of the* [b] *Genus into the Species excelleth.*

Expoſit. [a] *Of this kind*] Where the parts are effects. [b] *Genus*] The generall or kind into the ſpecialls, or ſorts.

3 *The Genus, or generall, is the whole that is* [a] *eſſentiall to the parts.*

Expoſit. [a] *Eſſentiall*] Giues being or eſſence to the parts; quite contrary to the Integrall, which receiveth being from the parts.

4 *The Species, ſpeciall, or ſort, is a part of the Genus, or generall.*

Such a part as receiveth being from it.

So, art is the generall or genus to Grammar, Logicke, Rhetericke, Arithmeticke, Geometry, and the reſt. For it cõtaineth the generall eſſence of al theſe; that is, an orderly fram of precepts, for inſtruction in ſomthing profitable to man. So is Grammar, for ſpeech; Rhetoricke, for pleading; Logicke for reaſoning; Arithmetick for numbring; Geometry for meaſuring; and every one of theſe hath this common nature, eſſence, or being, from Art; that it is ſuch a frame. For therefore it is ſuch a frame, becauſe it is an art. Examp. Expoſit.

The generall is either Soveraigne, or Supreame, Subiect, or Inferiour. 5

The Speciall is either Middlemoſt, or Loweſt. 6

The Supreame genus is that, which hath no genus aboue it.

So in Logicall Invention, an Argument, is the Supreame generall, of arguments artificiall, and Inartificiall: For there is none aboue it.

The Inferiour generall, and ſo the ſpeciall, is that, which is inferiour to one, and ſuperiour to another.

Expoſit. As in *Logicke*, an artificiall argument is inferiour to an argument; but ſuperiour to Primitiue, and Derivatiue arguments. Therefore an Argument (as I ſaid before) is the ſupreame or moſt generall; Artificiall is inferiour to it, but ſuperiour to every one, that followes in that ranke; and ſo is every one of them, to as many as come after them, in the ſame ranke; ſo that, all but an argument, are inferiour generalls, or middle ſpecialls; for thoſe two are all one; called ſpecialls, in reſpect of the generalls aboue thē; generalls, in regard of the ſpecialls vnder them.

The loweſt ſpeciall is that, which cannot be divided into other ſpecialls. Such are the matter, and the form of this or that particular;

Expoſit. As of this man, of that Lyon, or the like. The body of a man, or Lyon, may be diſtributed into divers parts; but they are members of an integrall, not ſpecialls of a generall.

The generalls, and the ſpecialls are badges of the cauſes, and effects: as in a living creature, there is a corporeall, or bodily ſubſtance, which is the matter, belonging ioyntly to man and beaſt.

For each of theſe is a bodily ſubſtance.

There is beſides, a facultie of life, and ſenſe; which is a forme that pertaineth æqually to the ſpecialls, Man and beaſt. For each of theſe hath life and ſenſe.

Therefore the generalls containe the cauſes, which belong ioyntly and æqually to their ſpecialls; and contrariwiſe, their ſpecialls containe the effects of their generalls.

Hereupon the generall is famous & excellent; as that, which declareth the cauſe. For it ſheweth the cauſe of the ſpecialls; which is ſhut vp in the generalls, and given by them to the ſpecialls. Expoſit.

The diſtribution of the generall into the ſpecialls, is indeede very excellent, but [a] *hardly and ſeldome to be found out.*

Expoſit. [a] *Hardly*] Becauſe the formes of the ſpecialls, are not eaſily knowne; and we haue no terme to expreſſe the generalls, and ſpecialls.

Yet for [a] *illuſtration and example ſake, we will ſet downe, what wee can.*

Expoſit. [a] *Illuſtration*] To make the matter cleare and plaine.

Examp. *Living creatures are divided by the* Poët *into ſix kinds,* Angels, Feinds, Men, Beaſts, Fowles, Fiſhes.

In heaven the bleſſed Angels haue their being;
In hell, the Feinds appointed to damnation:
To Men, & beaſts, earth yeelds firm habitation;
The wing'd Muſicians in the ayre are fleing.
With finnes the people gliding,
Of water haue the enioying. Dav: Ode: 9.

It is all one, whether we divide the generall into the ſpecials, or into the formes of the ſpecialls; becauſe the

the formes and generalls together, make the ſpecialls.

So that, if you adde the formes of the ſpecialls, to the generals, you haue the whole nature of them. For example; *Of living creatures, ſome*[a] *ſpeak, ſome are dumbe.* Expoſit.

[a] *Speake*] This is not a diſtribution by the formes, but by the proper adjuncts, following neceſſarily from the formes; and therfore is put in ſtead of a diſtribution by the forme. Perhaps wee may put this for an example; of Arts, one teacheth to ſpeake well; another to reaſon well; a third to number well; a fourth to meaſure well. Art is the generall; Grammar, Logick, Arithmeticke, Geometry, the ſpecialls; in ſtead whereof wee put ſpeaking well, reaſoning well, numbring well, meaſuring well, which are their formes. Expoſit.

Sometime the generall and ſpecials, are otherwiſe handled; ſo that the one is concluded from the other.

So Tully in his Oration for Archias the *Examp.*

Poët, cõcludeth from the generall, which is Art, that Oratory and Poëtry, are as it were of a kind.

Ovid contrariwiſe, argues the generall by the ſpecialls.

In this diſtreſſe, let vertue be thy ſtay:
Where danger ſtops, there glory makes her way.
While Troy had peace, braue Hector was not knowne;
In publike troubles, vertues force is ſhowne.
If Seas be calme, what neede we Typhis skill?
What's Phœbus art, when men are healthfull ſtill?
While fortune ſmiles, braue vertue hidden lies:
But when ſhee frownes, it ſhines in all mens eyes.

Ovid. Triſt. 4.

Expoſit. Here the *Poët* proveth the generall, that, Adverſitie ſheweth true vertue; by three ſpecialls: *Hectors* valour was made knowne in his Countryes danger; *Typhis* ſhewed his skill in ſtormes; *Phœbus* giues proofe of his art in ſickneſſe.

Therefore ſpeciall examples, applyed to their generall, belong to this place.

Examp. *By faith, the Elders were well reported of &c. By faith, Abell offered &c.*

By faith, Enoch was taken away, &c. Heb. 11. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. &c.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Diſtribution into the Subjects.

1 *There remaineth to be handled the diſtribution of arguments, which are conſentany after a ſort; as ſubiects, and adiuncts: Diſtribution by the ſubiects is, when the parts are ſubiects.*

Examp. *Thou ſhalt not make the likeneſſe of any thing, that is in heaven aboue, or in the earth beneath, or in the water that is vnder the earth.* Exod. 20. 4.

Expoſit. Creatures are divided by their ſubject places, wherein they abide, Heaven, Earth, Water.

Examp. *The Cities of Refuge, in the land of Iſraell, are divided according to the ſubiect place; three on this ſide Iordan, three beyond.*

Having therefore gifts differing, accor-

ding to the grace that is given to vs; whether Prophecy, let vs prophecy according to the proportion of faith; or Miniſtery, let vs wait on our Miniſtery; or he that teacheth, on teaching; or he that exhorteth, in exhortation; he that giveth, let him doe it with ſimplicitie; he that ruleth, with diligence; he that ſheweth mercy, with chearfulnes. Rom. 12. 6. 7. 8.

Expoſit. The gifts are diſtributed according to the objects; wherein they are employed; prophecy, miniſtery, teaching, exhorting, giving, ruling, ſhewing mercy.

Chap. XXVIII.

Of diſtribution by the adjuncts.

1 *Diſtribution by the Adiuncts is, when the parts are Adiuncts.*

Examp. *Of men, ſome are whole, ſome are ſicke; ſome rich, ſome poore.*

To one is given by the Spirit the word of wiſdome; to another the word of knowledge; to another faith; to another the gifts of healing; to another working of Miracles;

Miracles; to another Prophecy; to another diſcerning of ſpirits; to another divers kindes of tongues; to another the interpretation of tongues. 1 Cor. 12. 8. 9. 10.

Expoſit. Here the faithfull are divided, according to the gifts beſtowed, which are adjuncts.

The Amalekites dwell in the land of the South; and the Hittites, and the Iebuſites, & the Amorites dwell in the mountaines, and the Canaanites dwell by the Sea, and by the coaſts of Iordan. Num. 13. 20.

⁂

Chap. XXIX.

Of a Definition.

1 *A Definition is, when we declare what a thing is.* The declaration of the nature of a thing, is the definition thereof.

2 *The definition may be argued by the thing defined; as the thing is argued by it.*

3 *A definition is perfect, or unperfect.*

fect. That is properly called a definition; this a deſcription.

4 *A perfect definition, is a definition that conſiſts onely of thoſe cauſes, which conſtitute or make the eſſence of the thing; that is, of the matter and forme.*

According hereto, Man is defined, A reaſonable living creature. By the generall, living creature (as was ſaid) we underſtand a bodily ſubſtance, full of life and ſenſe, which is the matter of a man, and part of the forme: to which if you adde reaſonable, you ſhall haue the whole forme of a man, in the facultie of life, ſenſe, and reaſon.

Therefore a perfect definition is nothing elſe, but a generall marke, or badge of the cauſes, which make the eſſence, or the nature of the thing.

Such are the definitions of Arts.

Examp. *Grammar is an art of ſpeaking well.*

Rhetorick is an art of pleading well. Logick of reaſoning well; Arithmetick of numbring well; Geometry of meaſuring well.

Chap. XXX.

Of Deſcription.

1 *Deſcription is a definition, which deſcribeth, or ſets out, a thing, even by other arguments.* Though the matter and forme be not knowne, or ſet downe.

Examp. *As a man is a living creature, mortall, capable of learning.* In this deſcription of a man, two adjuncts (the one proper) are mingled, with ſome cauſe of his being; namely, the generall matter, *living creature.*

2 *But this brevitie, or ſhortnes, is not alwayes vſed, in this kind of defining; but oftentimes wee haue a more famous and goodly declaration.*

Examp. *I ſaw a woman ſit vpon a skarlet coloured beaſt, full of names of blaſphemy, having*

ving ſeaven heads, and ten hornes: and the woman was arayed in purple, and skarlet, and girded with gold and precious ſtones, and pearles, and had a cup of gold in her hand full of abominations, and filthineſſe of her fornications; and in her forehead a name written; A myſterie, Great Babylon, the mother of whoredomes, and abominations of the earth; And I ſaw the woman drunken with the blood of Saints, and with the blood of the Martyrs of Ieſus. Revel. 17. 4. 5. 6.

Salomons ſong is full of theſe deſcriptions: eſpecially Chap. 5. verſ. 10. to the end. And Chap. 6. from verſ. 3. to the 10.

There grew an aged tree on the greene,
A goodly Oak ſometime had it beene;
With armes full ſtrong & largely diſplay'd,
But of their leaues they were diſaraid.
The body bigge and mightily pight;
Throughly rooted, and of wondrous height.
Whilome had beene King of the field,
And Mochell maſt to the husband did yeeld.
And with his nuts larded many a ſwine,
But now the gray moſſe had marr'd his rine.

His bared boughs were beaten with ſtormes ;
His top was bald, and waſted with wormes :
His honour decayed, his branches ſere.
Shepheards Kalend. Febr.

Such are the deſcriptions of plants, and living creatures in naturall Philoſophy ; alſo of rivers, mountaines, and cities, in Geographie.

* * *

Chap. XXXI.

Of a Divine Teſtimony.

Having declared an artificiall argument, I come now to an Inartificiall argument. 1

An Inartificiall argument is that, which argueth not, of [a] *its owne nature, but by ſtrength taken from ſome* [b] *artificiall argument.* 2

[a] *Its owne nature*] Artificiall arguments argue, or declare a thing, of their owne nature ; The primitiue haue force to argue, both in, and of themſelues. The derivatiue in themſelues, but not of themſelues, The inar- Expoſit.

artificiall haue no ſtrength at all to argue, either of, or in themſelues.

[b] *Some artificiall*] Namely, from the efficient cauſe, or author of it ; vpon whoſe credit, all the ſtrength of an inartificiall argument dependeth.

3 *Therefore, when the [a] exact truth of a thing is narrowly ſought after, it hath very little force, to proue any thing.*

Expoſit. [a] *Exact*] The exact or perfect truth is narrowly ſought for, when we deſire to know διότι, the reaſon how a thing commeth to be ſo ; and in this inquiry no teſtimony can giue ſatisfaction. For it doth no more but ſay, It is ſo. The divine teſtimony is ſufficient to breed certainty, yea moſt ſufficient : but it is evidence, and cleerenes we ſeek for in the ſearch of truth; that we may ſee, how, and why it is ſo.

4 *But in civill and humane affaires, this argument, for the moſt part, hath ſpeciall force to perſwade, from the qualities of him that is witneſſe:*

witneſſe: if he be wiſe, vertuous, and a friend.

It is called in one word a teſtimony. 5

If it be with an oath, it is in Law tearmed a *Depoſition*; I thinke of laying a mans hands on the booke, when he ſweareth. Expoſit.

A teſtimony is Divine or humane. 6

Among Divine teſtimonies, the Heathen reckon not onely the Oracles of their Gods; but alſo the anſwers of their Prophets and Soothſayers. So do the *Papiſts* the *Decrees* of generall *Councels*, and of the Pope in his Conſiſtory. 7

I will take examples from the Oracles of the onely true God.

Of the tree of the knowledge of good & evill, thou ſhalt not eat. For the day, that thou eateſt thereof, thou ſhalt die. Gen. 2. 17. Examp.

I will put enmitie betwixt thee and the woman, betwixt thy ſeede and her ſeede. It ſhall bruiſe thy head, and thou ſhalt bruiſe his heele. Gen. 3. 15.

This is my beloved Sonne, in whom I am well pleaſed. Mat. 3. 17.

Whoſoever beleeveth, and is baptized, ſhall be ſaved. Mark. 16. 16.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of an hnmane teſtimony.

1 *An humane, or mans teſtimony, is common, or proper.*

2 *Common, as a Law written or unwritten; and a famous ſentence.*

Examp. *I make a Decree, that in every dominion of my kingdome, men tremble, and feare before the God of Daniell; for he is the living God, and remaineth for ever; and his kingdome ſhall not periſh, and his dominion ſhall be everlaſting.* Dan. 6. 26.

I make a Decree, that every people, nation, and language, which ſpeake any blaſphemy againſt the God of Shadrach, Meſhach, and Abednego, ſhall be drawne in peeces, and their houſes ſhall be made aiakes; becauſe there is no God, that can deliver after this ſort. Dan. 3. verſ. 29.

Famous ſentences are Proverbs. 3 *Examp.*

Let not him that girdeth on his ſword, boaſt himſelfe, as he that putteth it off. 1 King. 20. 11.

Phyſician heale thy ſelfe. Luk. 4.23.

The ſayings of wiſe men, which are alſo proper.

A good name is rather to be choſen than great riches. Prov. 22. 1.

Teſtimonies of living men, are not onely, when there is quæſtion of land, ſlaughter, debt, treſpaſſe, and ſuch like; but alſo obligations, confeſsions, and oaths, are teſtimonies.

A pledge or pawne, is a kind of obligation.

A confeßion is either free, or forced by torture.

Hitherto alſo may that argument be referred, when we proue that we ſay by experience.

Swearing alſo is a teſtimony.

Here the arguing from the teſtimony to the witneſſe, is not clearely and evidently true; that, Becauſe *the*

the teſtimony is true, therefore the witnes alſo is a ſpeaker of truth.

A ſpeaker of] He is *verax*, a ſpeaker of truth, who by an inward habit, vertue, or qualitie, is inclin'd and fitted to ſpeak the truth alwayes. A man may, vpō occaſion, for hope of good, or feare of hurt, ſpeake truth, and yet be no ſpeaker of truth. This onely followes vpon a true teſtimony, that he, which delivereth it, is in that particular, a true witneſſe.

THE

THE SECOND BOOKE of RAMVS *Logicke.*

CHAP. I.

What Iudgement is.

1 *Hitherto we haue handled the firſt part of* Logick, *called* Invention, *we come now to the ſecond, termed Iudgement.*

2 [a] *Iudgement is a* [b] *part of Logicke, touching the* [c] *diſpoſing of arguments, that we may Iudge* [d] *well.*

Expoſit. [a] I*udgement*] By Iudgement, wee meane the doctrine, that teacheth vs to diſpoſe, or joyne Arguments together ; whereas Invention ſheweth onely the nature of them ſeverally. [b] *Part*] Such a part, as the ſoule and body are of man ; which giue being to it; For (as I haue often ſayd) Logicke is nothing but

Invention & Iudgement. [c] *Diſpoſing*] That ſheweth vs, how Arguments are to be coupled, and ſet in order, each with other. [d] *Well*] As indeede wee ought to Iudge, according to truth; this is the end of diſpoſing, or joyning arguments together.

3 *For* [a] *every thing is to be iudged according to certaine* [b] *rules of diſpoſition.*

Expoſit. [a] *Every thing*] No true judgement can be given of any thing according to *Logicke*, vnleſſe arguments be ſo diſpoſed as art requires. [b] *Rules of*] If we would judge of truth and falſhood; we muſt joyne the arguments together, according to the rules of an Axiome or propoſition. If we would know; what followeth vpon this or that, what doth not; wee are to ſet downe our propoſitions after the rules of a Syllogiſme. Would we vnderſtand, whether things be orderly handled, or no? Let vs haue recourſe to the precepts concerning Method.

4 [a] *Hereof, this part of Logicke is called both Iudgement and Diſpoſition; the ſame thing being ſignified by both.*

Expoſit. [a] *Hereof*] Becauſe the end is judging, and the means to judge is diſpoſing: therefore this part hath both theſe names.

Chap. II.

Of the affirming or denying of an Axiome.

1 [a] *Iudgement is* [b] *Axiomaticall, or Dianoëticall.*

[a] I*Vdgement*] The rules, whereby we are taught to diſpoſe Arguments, & ſo to judge of them. [b] *Axiomaticall*] Aξίωμα in Greeke ſignifieth properly, authoritie, dignitie: with *Logicians* it is taken either for ſuch a propoſition, or ſentence, as is commonly knowne to be true; or generally for any propoſitiō whatſoever; in which ſenſe, *Tully*, *Ramus*, and many other vſe it.

Theſe rules are either concerning an *Axiome*; which onely ſetteth downe the arguments joyned together; or *Dianoëticall*, which diſcourſeth of them, ſome way or other; as ſhall appeare when wee come to that part.

All diſpoſing of arguments is either without diſcourſe, or with it; without it; when ſeing the arguments ſet downe in a propoſition, wee either yeeld to it as true, or refuſe it as falſe, or quæſtion it as doubtfull; of truth and falſhood apparant, a propoſition judgeth ſufficiently; when doubt ariſeth, we are faine to come to diſcourſe. Other way of judging there is none; Therefore all judgement is *Axiomaticall*, or *Dianoëticall*.

2 *An Axiome is the [a] diſpoſing of [b] one argument with another, wherby we iudge, that a thing [c] is, or is not.*

[a] *Diſpoſing*] It is called diſpoſition, or diſpoſing, rather then judgement; becauſe this floweth out of that; we judge by diſpoſing.

[b] *One argument*] For the parts of an *Axiom* are arguments ; and here appeareth the vſe of Invention, which ſheweth vs the nature of arguments. For if we know not the nature of the ſeverall arguments, how ſhall we be able to judge, whether they be rightly diſpoſed or no, and ſo, whether the *Axioms* be true or no?

[c] *Is, or is not*] Severall arguments cauſe no judgement at all, as, ſnow, white ; but if we joyne them together, and ſay, ſnow is white, it is judged, that ſomthing is ; if we ſay ſnow is not white, judgement is given, that ſomething is not.

Is, and is not, are largely to be taken, for all action, paſſion, all times, &c. as, *Ioab* kild *Abner* ; where the act, and the time paſt is noted. *The Sonne of man muſt ſuffer many things* ; where the paſſion, and time to come is ſignified. Neither doe theſe words onely note being, or not being ; but farther teach vs, that ſomething is this, or that ; as ſnow is white, giues vs to vnderſtand, that whiteneſſe is ſayd to belong to ſnow.

3 An *Axiom* is called in Engliſh, a propoſition, a ſentence, a ſpeech.

Ramus ſayth nothing of the parts of a propoſition; becauſe it is manifeſt, that the two arguments, make the two parts of it. The former is named by *Ramus* the Antecedent part, of *antecedere*, to goe before; the other conſequent of *conſequi*, to follow.

Ariſtotle calles the one the Leading tearme, the other the following.

Some name the former the 1. Leſſe terme, or extreame. 2. The ſubject. Leſſe; becauſe it is argued by the other; the ſubject, becauſe it is the object, or thing, to which the other is joyned, or which is declared; terme, or extreame; becauſe it is, as it were, one bound of the propoſition; namely, in the forepart.

The latter is called the 1. Greater terme, or extreame; becauſe the other is declared, or made knowne by it: 2. the Prædicate; as you would ſay, that which is proclaimed, or publiſhed of the former. 3. The attribute, that which is attributed, given, put, added, to the other to declare it.

That, which joynes theſe two arguments together, is called by *Ramus* the Bond, or Band; by other *Logicians* the Couple.

An Axiome is[a] *Affirmed, or*[b] *Denyed.* 4

[a] Affirmation by ſome is termed Compoſition, becauſe it joyneth the parts together.

[b] Negation is called Diviſion; becauſe it divides the parts aſunder.

Affirmed, when the[a] *band of it is affirmed; Denyed, when it is denyed.* 5

[a] *Band*] When the conſequent is tyed to the antecedent by the band, it is affirm'd; when it is ſevered from it, by denying the bond, it is denied.

From[a] *hence ariſeth the*[b] *contradiction of Axioms; when the ſame axiom is affirmed and denyed.* 6

[a] *From hence*] From the affirming, or denying the bond, or Couple.

[b] *Contradiction*] Gainſaying, of *con-*

tradicere, to ſay againſt, or contrary to that which was ſaid.

* * *

CHAP. III.

Of a true and falſe Axiome.

1 *Secondly, an Axiome, or propoſition, is True, or Falſe.*

2 *True, when it ſaith,*[a] *as the thing is. Falſe, contrary.* When it ſaith otherwiſe, then the thing is.

[a] *As the thing is*] Truth is the æqualitie, or agreement betwixt the thing, and the vnderſtanding; if wee conceiue the thing, as indeede it is; wee conceiue the truth, or truly, & rightly of it. From which conceit of ours, ſpeech followeth, and is true, or falſe accordingly.

3 *A true Axiome is Contingent, or Neceſſary.*

4 [a] *Contingent, when it is in ſuch ſort true, that it may alſo at ſome time be falſe.*

[a] *Contingent*] The word is commonly

ly vſed for that which happeneth, and is not ſuch as it is, by any neceſſitie of nature.

Philoſophers,& eſpecially Schoole-Divines, call all truth *Contingent*, which hath not abſolute neceſſitie of being; therefore all truth concerning created things, is with them *Contingent*; becauſe it might haue pleaſed God, that thoſe things ſhould haue beene otherwiſe. That which concerneth God in himſelfe, is abſolutely neceſſary. For it could by no meanes haue beene otherwiſe.

——*Fortune ſends ayd to the ventrous.*

Admit this be true to day, to morrow, or another time it may be falſe.

Therefore the iudgement of ſuch contingent truth, is termed opinion; which may be certainly known to a man, in reſpect of things paſt, and preſent; But the nature of things to come, will afford no ſuch certaintie; although [a] *all times are preſent in reſpect of God.* 5

[a] *All times*] Man cannot certainly

know what is to come, vnleſſe God reveale it to him, as he hath done many things in the Scriptures; But God can; the reaſon whereof *Ramus* thinketh (as the Schoolemen out of *Boetius* commonly hold) is, that, All times are preſent to GOD, and ſo all things in thoſe times certainly knowne, as being in his ſight.

6 *A neceſſary Axiome is, when it is alwayes true, and cannot be falſe;* as God is immortall. *Such an Axiom if it be affirmed, is called* Κατὰ παντός, *of* [a] *all*, or the whole.

[a] *Of all*] When the conſequent, or latter part of the propoſition is truly affirmed of all, or the whole antecedent, or former part.

7 *An Axiom neceſſarily falſe, is called an Impoſsible Axiom.* Which cannot poſſibly be true at any time. *As God is mortall.*

8 *Rules or* [a] *Precepts of Arts, ought to be in this ſort generall.*

[a] *Precepts*] Becauſe *Logick* inſtructs

and fits vs for the learning of all arts. *Ramus* thought it needfull to deliver rules to that purpoſe. Now where ſhould they be taught, but in the generall doctrine of an *Axiom*, before we come to the ſpecials: ſince in ſome arts, namely, Mathematicks, we muſt ſet downe, as well compound, as ſimple *Axioms*, which are the ſpecies or ſorts of an *Axiom*.

This rule requires, that every precept of an art be true; becauſe wee looke for the true knowledge of the art in the ſeverall Precepts. Therfore alſo muſt they be neceſſarily true; that they may breede judgement in vs, not opinion; which is vncertaine.

Laſtly; it is neceſſary they ſhould be affirm'd. For precepts which are denying *Axioms*, may perhaps ſhew vs how to avoyd ſome errour, but cannot make vs know the truth.

They muſt alſo be Homogeny, and Catholike. 9

An [a] *Homogeny axiom is, when one of* 10 *of the parts is* [b] *eſſentiall to the other; as the forme to the thing formed; the ſubiect to the proper adiunct; the generall to the ſpeciall: This is called* Καθ᾽ αὑτὸ *of it ſelfe; when the cōſequent part belongeth to the antecedent, of it ſelfe or eſſentially.*

[a] *Homogeny*] ὁμοῦ γένους, of the ſame kinde. [b] *Eſſentiall*] Giue eſſence, or being; as in the examples; the forme makes the thing formed to be that it is. The proper adjunct floweth from the forme naturally. The generall giues being to the ſpecialls. Rules of art muſt be thus eſſentiall, or els they cannot teach vs true knowledge, which conſiſteth in knowing the eſſence of things.

11 *A* [a] *Catholike Axiom is, when the conſequent is* [b] *alwayes true of the antecedent; not only of the* [c] *whole, and of it* [d] *ſelfe, but also* [e] *interchangeably.* Καθ᾽ ὅλου πρῶτον. *Firſt* [f] *of the whole.*

[a] *Catholike*] Is as much as vniverſall; Καθ' ὅλȣ, according to the whole. [b] *Alwayes*] Therefore it muſt be neceſſarily true; ſo that it cannot at any time be falſe: this is the firſt thing in this *Axiome.* [c] *Of the whole*] Of every part of the whole; ſo that there is nothing cõceived by the antecedent, to which the conſequent doth not agree: this is the ſecond. [d] *Of it ſelfe*] The conſequent muſt be true of the antecedent naturally, and properly, not by occaſion or accident: ſo is the forme of the thing formed; ſo the proper adjunct of the ſubject. [e] *Interchangeably*] So that the whole antecedent is in like ſort true of the conſequent; and will argue it, as it is argued by it: as in the examples.

Examp.

A man is a living creature indued with reaſon. Every living creature indued with reaſon is a man. Here is the forme arguing the thing formed, and the thing formed arguing the forme.

Number is even or odd: whatſoever is even or odd is number. Here we haue the proper adjunct, *even, or odd*; affirmed of the ſubject; the number, and the ſubject contrariwiſe of the proper adjunct.

A Wolſe doth naturally howle; whatſoever doth naturally howle is a Wolfe. Here alſo is the proper adjunct coupled with the ſubject to declare it, and in like ſort the ſubject with the proper adjunct. [f] *Firſt of the whole*] That is vniverſally firſt.

12 *Theſe are the three lawes that muſt be kept in framing rules of Art; The firſt is called the law of truth,* becauſe it requires, that the *Axiom* be neceſſarily true, in the agreement of the parts, antecedent, and conſequent.

The ſecond is named the Law of Iuſtice; becauſe it will haue every one haue his due, and not abide, that thoſe things be coupled together, which agree not by their very eſſence, or nature.

The third is termed the Law of Wiſdome; becauſe precepts or rules thus fram'd, breed true and certaine knowledge.

And the [a] *iudgement of* [b] *ſuch true and Catholike axiums, is the* [c] *firſt and moſt true knowledge.* 13

[a] *The iudgement*] That is bred in vs by the vnderſtanding, and beleeving ſuch manner of *Axiums.* [b] *Such true*] *Axiums* in ſuch manner true and Catholike. [c] *Firſt*] Either becauſe it is the knowledge of principles, vpon which all the other dependeth ; or perhaps (as *Ariſtotle* ſpeaketh) proper : For many times he calleth that which is proper, firſt.

CHAP. IIII.

Of a ſimple Axiom.

And thus much of the [a] *common affections of an axiom: the* [b] *kinds of axioms follow.* 1

[a] *Common affections*] Affections are, as it were properties ; how then are they common? As laughing & ſpeaking are proper to mankind ; but common to every ſingular man,

one and other. [b] *Kinds*] The diverſe kinds and ſorts of *Axioms* are next to be handled: the affections or properties of affirming and denying of truth and falſhood, doe not make diverſe kinds of propoſitions; but note certaine things belonging to all kinds; ſo that every kind is either affirmed, or denyed, true or falſe.

2 *An axiom is ſimple or Compound.*

A ſimple axiom is that, the [a] band whereof is a [b] Verbe.

[a] *Band.*] This band is as it were the forme of an *Axiom*; therefore as the band differeth, ſo doth the thing it ſelfe. Therefore there is good reaſon to make divers kinds of *Axioms*, according to the diverſitie of the band, or couple. [b] *A verbe.*] That word in Grammar or ſpeech is a Verbe, which ſignifieth doing, ſuffering, or being. *He that loveth me keepeth my commandements*: there are two verbs in this ſentence, *loveth*, and *keepeth*; both which note ſome action or doing. *The Lord Ieſus was crucified.* Here the

verbe is, *was crucified*; For wee haue not one word, as the *Hebrewes*, *Grecians*, and *Romanes* haue, to expreſſe the verb paſſiue, or ſuffering. *Ieſus Chriſt is God.* The verbe here is the word *Is*, which noteth being.

In every *Axiom* there is one verbe or other, as ſhall be ſhewed.

Therefore the axiom is affirmed or denyed, as the verbe is: as Fire burneth. This axiom is affirmed, or affirmatiue, becauſe the verbe burneth, the band of it, is affirmed. 3

Burneth is a verbe actiue, noting doing. *Fire is hot. The verbe Is, is affirmed. Therefore the axiom is affirmed: becauſe the band is.*

Fire is not water: This *Axiom* is denyed or negatiue; becauſe the band *Is* being the verbe, is denyed.

In theſe *Axioms*, fire is the antecedent, or former part of the *Axiom*; burneth the conſequent, including or conteining the verb, or band in it. In the ſecond; the conſequent is, *hot*: in the third, *water*.

4 *Here haue we the firſt kind of diſpoſing or ioyning arguments made knowne to vs by Invention: as in the firſt example, Fire burneth; The cauſe with the effect. In the ſecond. Fire is hot: The ſubiect with the adiunct. In the third, Fire is not water; two diſſentanies, Adverſatiues one with another.*

5 *And* [a] *thus may any argument (except* [b] *full compariſons and diſtributions) be ſet downe, in a propoſition;* [c] *Conſentanies affirmatiuely, Diſſentanies negatiuely.*

[a] *Thus*] In a ſimple *Axiom*, making the verbe the band. [b] *Full compariſons*] For ſuch compariſons and diſtributions, muſt needs haue a conjunction to couple them together. [c] *Conſentanies affirmatiuely*] Conſentany arguments muſt be joyned together, by way of affirmation, or affirming; diſſentany by way of negation, or denying. This of conſentany ar-

arguments, is to be thus vnderſtood; if you argue a conſentany argument by a conſentany, you muſt affirme the one by the other; as *Paul* writ diverſe Epiſtles; but if you will deny the effect of the cauſe, or ſhew that this effect belongeth not to that cauſe, you muſt deny the one of the other; as *Paul* writ not divers Epiſtles. *Paul* and *writing Epiſtles* are cauſe & effect; in the one I affirme the effect of the cauſe, and ſo they are properly conſentany; in the other, I deny the ſame effect of the ſame cauſe, and ſo make a contradiction. Therefore the ſame arguments remaine; els how ſhould it be the ſame *Axiom*? And if the *Axioms* be diverſe, there can be no contradiction.

A ſimple axiom is generall or ſpeciall. 6

Generall, when the common conſequent is [a] *generally attributed to the common antecedent.* 7

[a] *Generally attributed*] Attributed, prædicated; either affirmed or deny-

ed; To be generally attributed, is to be ſo attributed, that nothing is contained vnder the ſignification of the antecedent, or ſubject, to which the conſequent or prædicate may not truly be applyed. As, *Man is a reaſonable creature.* This is a generall *Axiom*, becauſe there is nothing conteined vnder the terme *Man*, which is the ſubject of this propoſition, to which the attribute *Reaſonable creature* doth not belong.

8 *And here contradiction doth not alwayes divide truth from falſhood; but both parts may be falſe in a contingent propoſition.*

No Church in London is fairer then
Mary-Wool Church.
Each Church in Londō is fairer then
Mary-Wool-Church.

Both theſe propoſitions are falſe; For there are ſome Churches fairer, ſome not ſo faire.

9 *Yea in axioms not contingent alſo, ſometime both parts of the contradiction are falſe*: as,

Every living creature is reaſonable.
No living creature is reaſonable.
Both falſe.

10 *A ſpeciall axiom is particular or proper.*

Particular, when the common conſequent is particularly attributed to the antecedent: And this axiom muſt be contradicted by a generall: as,

1. *Some ſinnes are pardonable.*
No ſinnes are pardonable.
2. *Some clemency is not praiſe-worthy*
All clemency is prayſe-worthy.

11 *A proper axiom is when the* [a] *conſequent is attributed to a* [b] *proper antecedent:* as,

Paul is an Apoſtle. the contra-
Paul is not an Apoſtle. diction is

[a] *Conſequent*] Whether it be generall or ſpeciall.

[b] *Proper*] That is, ſingular, or individuall, as it is called; which cannot be divided into lower ſpecies, or ſpecialls.

Chap. V.

Of a Copulatiue Axiom.

1 *A Compound axiom is that, the band whereof is a Coniunction.*

THe parts wherof are coupled together by a conjunction. A conjunction is a word that joyneth the parts of ſpeech together; of *coniungere*, to joyne together. This is generally called an Hypotheticall propoſition; though indeed hypotheticall, is one ſpeciall kind of a compound *Axiom*.

2 *Therefore by the affirming, or denying of the coniunction, the axiom it ſelfe is affirmed or denyed.* For the band is the forme of an *axiom*: as hath beene ſaid.

3 *And one part of the contradiction is true, the other falſe.*

One of the propoſitions, that gainſay each other, is true, the other falſe.

4 *A Compound axiom is* [a] *congregatiue, or ſegregatiue; according as the coniunction is.* [a] Con-

[a] *Congregatiue*] Of *congregare*, to gather the flocke together, comes Congregatiue: this ſheweth, that the diverſe parts in the propoſition belong to the ſame thing.

A Congregatiue axiom diſpoſeth conſentany arguments, by[a] *way of affirmation, diſſentany by way of negation.* 5

[a] *By way of*] When there be diverſe conſentany arguments in a propoſition, if the one be affirmed of the ſubject, ſo muſt the other be alſo: and contrariwiſe; if one be denyed, ſo muſt the other be alſo: If there be diverſe diſſentanies, the one muſt be denyed, the reſt affirmed; or contrariwiſe.

And it (a congregatiue *axiom*) 6

is either { *Copulatiue.*
Connexiue.

Copulatiue, the coniunction whereof is Copulatiue. 7

Copulare, to couple: *copula*, a couple for doggs: When the band or couple is a conjunction, that knits the parts of ſpeech together, then the *Axiom* is copulatiue; as,

The Lord Ieſus was delivered to death for our ſinnes, and raiſed againe for our iuſtification. Here are two conſentany arguments, namely, adjuncts: *delivered to death, raiſed againe*; the former is affirmed of our Saviour; therefore the latter muſt be affirmed too.

It is ſaid of the heavenly *Ieruſalem.* Revel. 22. 15. *Without ſhall be dogs, and ſorcerers, and murtherers, & whoremongers, and idolaters, and whoſoever loveth, and maketh a lye.* The contradiction is; *Without ſhall not be dogs, and ſorcerers, and murtherers, &c.*

8 *To make a copulatiue axiom true, it is required, that all the parts thereof be true: to make it falſe, it is enough, that ſome one of the parts be falſe.*

As, if either doggs, or ſorcerers, or murtherers, or whoremongers, or idolaters, or lyers be not without, then the whole propoſition is falſe, which ſayth, they are all without.

9

Neere of kind to this is an axiom, wherin there is a [a] *relation of qualitie or quantitie; and in ſuch propoſitions, the* [b] *relation it ſelfe is the coniunction.*

[a] *Relation of qualitie*] Thoſe propoſitions, wherein comparatiue arguments are ſet downe at large, ſo that the one part hath reference of qualitie or quantitie to the other, are to be referred to the Copulatiue *Axiom*.

[b] *Relation it ſelfe*] Theſe propoſitions are coupled together by the relation that is betwixt them; which is in ſtead of a conjunction.

As a bird, that wandreth from her neſt: ſo is a man, that wandreth from his place. Prov. 27. 8.

Here we iudge of truth & falſhood, as if it were a copulatiue axiom: in this ſort.

A bird that wandreth from her neſt is in danger; and ſo is a man that wandreth from his place.

The negation, and contradiction is, A man that wandreth from his place, is not as a bird that wandreth from her neſt.

CHAP. VI.
Of a Connexe Axiom.

1 *A[a] Connexe axiom is a [b] Congregatiue axiom, the coniunction wherof is a coniunction [c] connexiue.*

[a] CONNEXE] Of *connectere*, to knit together. [b] *Congregatiue*] Therfore all, that was noted before of a Congregative *axiom*, muſt be vnderſtood alſo of a Connexe. [c] *Connexiue*] Grammarians commonly call theſe conjunctions conditionall; and this is properly an Hypotheticall propoſition.

If in this life onely we haue hope in Chriſt, we are of all men moſt miſerable. 1 Cor. 15. 19.

The contradiction to a Connexe propoſition, is properly by a diſcrete *axiom*: wherein alſo the chiefeſt vſe of that *axiom* conſiſts: Although in this life only we haue hope in Chriſt, yet are we not of all men moſt miſerable.

If I yet pleaſed men, I ſhould not be the ſeruant of God. Gal. 1. 10.

The contradictory is, Though I yet pleaſed men; I ſhould be the ſeruant of God.

2 *This coniunction is ſometime more manifeſtly denyed, by denying the conſequence*; by denying, that the latter followes vpon the former: as *I am not by and by a cut throat, if I keepe company with cut-throats.* Cic: pro: Sext: Roſc.

It doth not preſently follow, that if every propoſitiō be true or falſe, then the cauſes of things are vnchangable. *de Fata.*

3 *For the affirmation implyeth, that if the antecedent be the cōſequent alſo is: But the negation and contradiction ſaith, that Although the antecedent be, yet it followes not, that the conſequent therefore is.*

4 *Wherefore, when you iudge that a connexe axiom is abſolutely, ſimply, and of it ſelfe,* (or of its nature) *true, you ſhall iudge alſo, that it is neceſſarily true: and you ſhall vnderſtand, that this neceſſitie ariſeth, from the neceſſary knitting of the parts together; which may be, where the parts are falſe.*

If a man be a Lyon he is fourefooted, is an *axiom* neceſſarily true: and yet the parts are falſe: For it is falſe, that a man is a Lyon; and it is as falſe that he is fourfooted: yet if you grant the former, that he is a Lyon; you muſt needs alſo grant, that he is fourfooted: For every Lyon hath foure feete.

But if the connexion be contingent, and be taken onely as probable, the iudgement we attaine to by it, is but opinion onely: as,

If thou ſpeake kind words to them, they will ſerue thee for ever. 1 King. 12.17.

This was likely, but not certaine.

5 *There is a relation of conſequence, which is of the ſame nature with a connexe axiom: as, ſeeing Tully is an Orator, he can plead well.*

Such in a manner are theſe:

Whereas there are among you envying, and ſtrife, and diviſions, are you not carnall? 1 Cor. 3. 3.

The contradictory is. Though we haue theſe amongſt vs: yet are we not carnall.

The Phariſies ſayd unto him. Thou bearest record of thy ſelfe, thy record is not true. Ioh[illegible]. 13.

Here the connexion is not expreſſed; but it is manifeſt by our Saviours anſwer, that they ſo diſputed againſt him, as if they ſhould haue ſayd; ſince thou beareſt record of thy ſelfe, thy record is not true: For he anſwers in the next verſe; *though I beare record of my ſelfe; yet my record is true.*

Sometime the conjunction is not expreſſed at all; *yee ſhall not eate of it, neither ſhall ye touch it, leaſt yee die. And the Serpent ſayd unto the woman,* *yee*

yee ſhall not ſurely die. Gen. 3. 3. 4. The contradiction is, Although yee eate, yet yee ſhall not dye.

Chap. VII.

Of a Diſcrete Axiom.

1 *A [a] Segregatiue axiom is that, the [b] coniunction whereof is ſegregatiue.*

[a] SEgregatiue] Of *Segregare*, to part or ſevere the flocke; generally to ſeparate. [b] *Coniunction*] That word is a conjunction *Segregatiue*, which ſevereth or divideth the parts of ſpeech each from other.

2 *In this propoſition the parts are ſevered or divided, as not agreeing. Therefore onely diſſentany arguments are diſpoſed in ſegregatiue axioms.*

3 *A ſegregatiue propoſition is either diſcrete or diſiunct.*

4 [a] *Diſcrete, the coniunction whereof is* [b] *diſcretiue.*

[a] *Diſcrete*] Of *diſcernere*, to ſever or ſeparate. Hence diſcerning in Engliſh, when a man ſees how one thing differs from another. [b] *Diſcretiue*] A conjunction Diſcretiue, ſevereth the parts of the propoſition: yet ſo, that they are ſignified to differ but in ſome ſort.

[a] *Therefore among the diſſentanies, it conſiſts eſpecially of arguments, that are diverſe from each other.* 5

[a] *Therefore*] Becauſe it noteth but a ſmall diſagreement.

Though I walke through the vale of the ſhadow of death, I will feare no evill. Pſal. 23. 4. *Examp.*

The contradictory is; If I walke through the vale of the ſhadow of death, I will feare ſome evill.

Though I be rude in ſpeech, yet I am not ſo in knowledge. 2 Cor. 11. 6.

The contradictory is; If I be rude in ſpeech, I am ſo in knowledge.

A diſcrete axiom is iudged to be true and good, if the parts be not onely true, but alſo [a] *diverſe.* 6

[a] *Diverſe*]

[a] *Diverſe*] It is not enough to the truth and goodneſſe of a diſcrete axiom, that the parts be true; vnleſſe they be alſo diverſe each from other: otherwiſe it is falſe and ridiculous: as, *Though Paul were an Apoſtle; yet he was ſent by the Lord Ieſus to Preach the Goſpell.* Here both parts be true; *Paul* was an Apoſtle; *Paul* was ſent by the Lord Ieſus to Preach the Goſpell; and yet the propoſition is ridiculous and abſurd; becauſe the parts are not diverſe. For to be an Apoſtle, and to be ſent by the Lord Ieſus to Preach the Goſpell, are not diverſe things, but the ſame.

CHAP. VIII.

Of a Disjunct axiom.

1 *A [a] diſiunct axiom is a ſegregatiue propoſition, the coniunction whereof is a Diſiunctiue.*

[a] *Diſiunct*] Of *Diſiungere*, to disjoyne, to vnyoak, to ſeparate. A conjunction disjunctiue wholy divideth one part of ſpeech from another.

Examp. *The Lord ſhall ſmite him, or his day ſhall come to dye, or he ſhall deſcend into battaile and periſh.* 1 Sam. 26.10.

The contradiction is. Neither ſhall the Lord ſmite him, nor his day come to die, neither ſhall he deſcend into battaile and periſh.

No man can ſerue two Maiſters. For either he will hate the one, and loue the other, or hold to the one, and deſpiſe the other. Mat. 6. 24

The contradiction is. Neither will he hate the one, and loue the other: nor hold to the one, and deſpiſe the other.

By contradiction we ſignifie, that there is no neceſſity, that one of them ſhould be true.

Here it is preſumed, that onely one of the things disjoyned is true. Whether it be ſo or no indeed; he that maketh the disjunction, taketh it for granted that it is ſo.

2 *If the diſioyning, or ſevering, be* [a] *abſolutely true, it is alſo neceſſarily true, & the parts ſevered are*

[b] *oppoſit without any middle.*

[a] *Abſolutely*] Not contingently, but ſimply; ſo that they cannot be falſe.

[b] *Oppoſit*] Are ſuch oppoſits, as haue no middle thing betwixt them: therefore they are not diſparats, but contraries.

3 *Yet: Although a disiunction abſolutely true, be alſo neceſſary: it is not neceſſary, that the parts ſeverally taken be neceſſary:* as,

A man is good or not good; is a neceſſary disjunctiō: yet A man is good; is not a neceſſary *axiom*: Alſo a man is not good, is not a neceſſary *axiom*. For theſe propoſitions are but contingently true, not neceſſarily.

4 *But the* [a] *neceßitie of the disiunction dependeth vpon the neceſſary oppoſition of the parts, not vpon the neceſſary truth of them.*

[a] *Neceſſitie of the*] That which maketh the disjunction neceſſarily true, is, that the parts are neceſſarily ſet each againſt other; whether they be neceſſarily true or no, if you conſider them ſeverally.

Now a diſiunction is for the moſt part vpon a condition: as, 5

If it be demanded, whether the *Iewes* will free the *Lord Ieſus*, or *Barrabas*; becauſe the deputie had reſolved, they ſhould haue but one of the two.

If therefore the diſiunction be contingent, it is not abſolutely true, but onely probable, or likely, *and ſuch diſiunctions men ordinarily make*: as 6

Yet though in vaine needs muſt I ſpeake,
Or els my ſwelling heart will breake.

Dav: canz: 15.

Neither of theſe is neceſſary; though he ſpake not; yet his heart might not breake.

Chap. IX.

Of a Syllogiſme, and the parts thereof.

Thus haue wee declared the iudgement which is Axiomaticall, or by an axiom, to wit, *of an axiom manifeſt of it ſelfe. Now followeth* 1

Dianoëticall, or diſcurſiue, the judgement wee attaine to by diſcourſe.

2 *Diſcourſe is, when one Axiom is drawne out of another.*

3 *And it is either a Syllogiſme, or Method.*

4 *A* [a] *ſyllogiſme is a diſcourſe, wherein the* [b] *quæſtiō is ſo diſpoſed with the argument, that if the antecedent be granted, it muſt* [c] *neceſſarily be concluded.*

[a] *Syllogiſme*] Of Λογίζομαι, to caſt account, of λέγω, to gather together, when by adding, ſubducting, multiplying, or deviding, we find out what the ſumme, the reſt, the number, or the quotient is. [b] *Quæſtion*] This *Ramus* expoundeth in the words following the definition. [c] *Neceſſarily concluded*] The concluſion of every true ſyllogiſme, neceſſarily followeth vpon the antecedent or former part: ſo that if you grant that, you muſt of neceſſitie yeeld the conſequent, or concluſion.

5 *For when an axiom is [a] doubtfull, it is made a [b] quæſtion: for the proofe wherof we haue need of a [c] third argumēt [d] diſpoſed with the quæſtiō.*

[a] *Doubtfull*] An *axiom* manifeſt of it ſelfe, needeth no other rules to teach vs how to judge of it, then haue alreadie bin delivered: but if it be doubtfull, ſo that it appeare not plainely, whether it be true or falſe, it becommeth a quæſtion.

[b] *Quæſtion*] A matter to be enquired of; *Quærere*, is to enquire, or ſeeke out. [c] *Third argument*] Wee vnderſtand that every propoſition hath two arguments, the one in the former part of it, the other in the latter; if it be not manifeſt, whether theſe agree or diſagree, as in truth they ought to doe, we muſt haue a third, as it were an vmpire. This is called in other *Logicks*, *Medius terminus*, the middle terme; becauſe the arguments are called termes; or *Medium*, the meane, or middle. [d] *Diſpoſed*] How this muſt be don, the precepts following ſhew.

6 *The* [a] *Antecedent*, or former part, *of a ſyllogiſme hath two parts, the* [b] *Propoſition and Aſſumption.*

[a] *Antecedent*] There are two parts of a ſyllogiſme; the former called the antecedent, the latter called the conſequent, or concluſion. The antecedent alſo it ſelfe hath two parts.

[b] *Propoſition*] This word *Propoſition*, is now the third time vſed in *Logicke*. Firſt, it ſignified the former part of a full Compariſon of likeneſſe, which we might haue named the *Reſembler*; becauſe it reſembleth the thing it declareth. Secondly, it is put for an *axiom*; and in this ſenſe it is well known almoſt to every ordinary man: and therefore I thinke it may not conveniently be altered. Thirdly, in this place it ſignifieth the firſt propoſitiõ in a ſyllogiſme; and it is reaſonable well knowne by that name, neither haue I any ſo fit to put in the place of it.

7 *The propoſition is the firſt part of the antecedent, wherein* [a] *at the leaſt,*

leaſt, the [b] *conſequent part of the quæſtion is placed with the argument.*

[a] *At the leaſt*] Becauſe in componnd ſyllogiſmes, not onely the conſequent, but the whole quæſtion, is ſet downe in the propoſition. [b] *Conſequent*] The Prædicate, or attribute, which followeth the band or couple, muſt in every ſyllogiſme be placed in ſome part of the propoſition.

This is termd the *Maior* or greater propoſition; becauſe the aſſumption is taken out of it. It is cõmonly called the *Maior*; without adding propoſition.

The Aſſumption is the ſecond part of the antecedent, [a] *which is* [b] *taken out of the propoſition.*

[a] *Which is*] It may ſeeme, that as the conſequent of the quæſtion was diſpoſed in the propoſition, with the third arguments; ſo the antecedent ſhould be in the aſſumption. But many times, in a connexe ſyllogiſme, there is nothing in the aſſumption,

but the third argument; as, If the Father be a Lord, the ſonne is a ſlaue: But the Father is a Lord; which is the third argument. [b]*Is taken*] In a compound ſyllogiſme, ſometime onely the third argument (as I noted) is taken out of the propoſition, and maketh the whole aſſumption: now becauſe that is the principall thing for proofe, it is ſayd, that the aſſumption is taken because that is taken.

But indeed this manner of diſcourſe is onely in a ſimple ſyllogiſme. The propoſition, which is as it were the foundation of the whole frame, is for the moſt part ſome generall rule of one Art or other; and therefore conteineth the argument, but in a generall manner; the aſſumption takes it out of the Propoſition, and applyeth it neerer to the poynt in quæſtion.

9 *The Conſequent*, or latter part, *of the ſyllogiſme, is that which* [a]*comprizeth the parts of the queſtion, and* [b]*concludeth it; whence it is called*

led the[c] *Complexion and Concluſion.*

[a] *Comprizeth*] In the propoſition and aſſumption, for the moſt part (alwaies in a ſimple ſyllogiſme) there is but one part of the quæſtiō, *viz.* the ſubject or prædicate, the concluſion evermore hath them both. [b] *Concludeth it*] Of *Concludere*, of *Claudo*, to ſhut vp: this taketh the whole quæſtion, and ſhuts it vp, for as much as concerneth that ſyllogiſme. [c] *Complexion*] Of *complecti*, to embrace, or compriſe, is *Complexion*, which compriſeth and concludeth the quæſtion.

If[a] *any part of a ſyllogiſme be wanting, it is called an*[b] *Enthymeme.* 10

[a] *Any part*] It falleth out commonly, that in the writings of learned men, either the propoſition, or the aſſumption, or the concluſion, or ſome one or two of them is not ſet downe.

[b] *Enthymeme*] It is a Greeke word, and hath nothing in it, whereby the nature of the thing is ſignified. For it is nothing but an vnperfect ſyllogiſme.

11 *If there be any* [a] *other part beſides theſe three, it is called a* [b] *Proſyllogiſme.*

[a] *Other part*] Somtimes, yea very often, good Authors adde to the propoſition or aſſumption, ſomewhat, which may ſerue to the proofe of that to which it is added. [b] *Proſyllogiſme*] I can giue no ſufficient reaſon of this name; vnleſſe I ſay it ſignifieth as much as For a ſyllogiſme; as if this proofe were in ſtead of a ſyllogiſme, to make the *Axiom* good.

12 *Alſo the order of the parts is often confounded:* the parts being placed otherwiſe, then they ſhould be; as the aſſumption or concluſion firſt, the propoſition laſt.

13 *If any doubt ariſe hereupon, the things* or axioms *that are wanting muſt be ſupplyed; thoſe that are ſuperfluous, muſt be cut of; and every part is to be ſet in his due place.*

CHAP. X.

Of a Contract ſimple ſyllogiſme.

A ſyllogiſme is ſimple, or compoũd. 1

Theſe are the ſeverall kinds of *Syllogiſmes.*

Simple, where the Conſequent part of the queſtion is placed in the propoſition, the antecedent in the aſſumption: This is called *Categoricall.* 2

And it is affirmatiue, when all the parts are affirmatiue. Negatiue, when either part of the antecedent is Negatiue, and the Concluſion. 3

In an affirmatiue ſyllogiſme, all parts, propoſition, aſſumption, and concluſiõ muſt be affirmed: It is enough to make a negatiue ſyllogiſme, that either propoſition or aſſumption be denyed, and the concluſion, though the other part be affirmed.

A ſyllogiſme is generall, when the propoſition, and aſſumption are generall. Speciall, when either of them 4 *them is ſpeciall.* [a]*Proper, when both are proper.*

[a]*Proper*] Proper is here taken Grammatically, when there is ſome proper name; other *Logicians* call it *Singular*, which is the loweſt, or moſt ſpeciall *Species*, according to *Ramus*; to other *Individuum*, that cannot be divided into any inferiour *Species*, or into any, that are more ſpeciall.

5 *A ſimple ſyllogiſme hath the parts contracted or explicated.*

6 *A* [a] *contract ſyllogiſme is, when the argument, brought as an* [b] *example, is ſo applyed to the* [c] *particular queſtion, that it is the* [d] *antecedent in both parts, and the aſſumption* [e] *affirmed.*

[a] *Contract*] Of *contrahere*, to draw together; it is ſo called, becauſe the parts of the ſyllogiſme are as it were cruſht vp together. [b] *Example*] There are foure things required to a contract ſyllogiſme; the firſt, that the argument be brought by way of example.

ample. [c] The ſecond thing is, that the queſtion be a particular *Axiom.* [d] *Antecedent*] The third is, that the argument be the ſubject or former part, both in the propoſition, and aſſumption. For ſo we conceiue vpon the hearing. [e] *Affirmed*] The laſt is, that the aſſumption be affirmed.

Some confidence is a vertue; as conſtancy.
Some confidence is not a vertue; as audaciouſnes.

Exam.

Here the quæſtion is particular; *ſome confidence is a vertue:* the argument is brought by way of example, *as conſtancy:* which is all one, as if we ſhould ſay, for example, *conſtancy.* Vpon the hearing or thought of this propoſition, we ſtreight way conceiue, that *conſtancy,* which is the argument, *is a vertue:* and that the ſame *conſtancy* is *confidence*; as if it were ſayd in expreſſe termes; that *conſtancy* is a *vertue,* and that it is *confidence*; and in this manner of our conceiving, we make the argument *conſtancy,* the antecedent in the propoſition, and aſſumption. So in the negatiue example. Laſtly, the aſſumption is affirmed.

Thus

7 *Thus* [a] *vſe*, practiſe, *in reaſoning, which is the rule of ſyllogiſticall iudgement*, or judging by a ſyllogiſme, *hath* [b] *contracted this ſyllogiſme; not otherwiſe unfolded* or ſtretched it out.

[a] *Vſe*] The practiſe of learned men, that reaſon well, is one of the breeders of *Logicke*; and therefore is to be followed in teaching *Logicke.* [b] *Contracted*] This is, if not the onely, yet the ordinary courſe of diſputing by this kind of ſyllogiſme ; perhaps ſome examples may be found, where it is expreſt at large, in the ſeverall parts: as yet, I thinke, none haue beene.

8 *And this* [a] *expoſition is made by Ariſtotle the* [b] *beginning of a ſyllogiſme, the parts whereof are expreſſed; as if it were of it ſelfe* [c] *more cleare and famous; then iudgment by a full ſyllogiſme.*

[a] *Expoſition*] *Ariſtotle* calleth this kind of reaſoning by applying, a ſpe-

ciall example to the concluding of a particular quæſtion, ἔκθεσιν, *expoſitionem*; to this *Ramus* hath reference, when he calleth this ſyllogiſme, *expoſition*. [b] *Beginning*] Becauſe this (as I ſhewed in the expounding of it) hath as it were an whole ſyllogiſme in it, eaſily to be diſcerned. [c] *More cleare*] Becauſe it ſheweth vs all at once, at one view, and requireth not any farther enlarging. This is the third figure in *Ariſtotle*. Now figure in *Ariſtotle* ſignifies the diſpoſing of the middle terme with the parts of the queſtion; which may be done three wayes, as we ſee in *Ramus*. The third figure is, when the argument is made the ſubject, or antecedent in both parts; as in a *contract* ſyllogiſme. Some Interpreters of *Ariſtotle*, haue deviſed certaine words, as they call them, to ſhew how many wayes we may conclude in theſe figures, which they ſignifie by ſeverall words; wherein *A* notes a generall affirmatiue propoſition: *E* a generall negatiue: *I* a particular affirmatiue: *O* a particular negatiue. In this third figure, there are ſix Moods, or ſeverall wayes of concluing; as theſe ſix words ſignifie.

DARAPTI, FELAPTON, DISAMIS,
DATISI, BOCARDO, FERISON.

Affirmatiue generall.

DA- *All conſtancy is a vertue.*
RAP- *All conſtancy is confidence.*
TI. *Therefore ſome confidence is a vertue.*

Negatiue generall.

FE- *No audaciouſneſſe is a vertue.*
LAP *All audaciouſneſſe is confidence.*
TON. *Therefore ſome confidence is not a vertue.*

Affirmatiue ſpeciall.

DI- *Some Chriſtians liue wickedly.*
SA- *All Chriſtians are profeſſors of Religion.*
MIS. *Therefore ſome profeſſors of Religion doe liue wickedly.*

Affirmatiue ſpeciall.

DA- *All beleevers ſhall be ſaved.*
TI- *Some beleevers doubt of their ſalvation.*
SI. *Therefore ſome that doubt of their ſalvation, ſhall be ſaved.*

Negatiue ſpeciall.

BO- *Some righteous men are not learned.*
CAR- *All righteous men ſhall be ſaved.*
DO. *Therefore ſome that ſhall be ſaved, are not learned.*

Negatiue ſpeciall.

FE- *No wicked livers ſhall be ſaved.*
RI- *Some wicked livers are baptized.*
SON. *Therefore ſome that are baptized, ſhall not be ſaved.*

CHAP. XI.

Of the firſt kind of a ſimple explicate Syllogiſme.

In an [a] *explicate ſyllogiſme, the propoſition is* [b] *alwayes generall, or proper, and the concluſion like the* [c] *antecedent, or* [d] *weaker part.* 1

[a] EXplicate] *Plicare* is to fold ; *explicare* to vnfold: of this, a ſyllogiſme, which is ſpread abroad, the parts of it being layd out to ſight, is called *explicate.* [b] *Alwayes*] Namely, where the ſyllogiſme conſiſts of ſimple propoſitions. [c] *Antecedent*] The propoſition and aſſumption: namely, like them, in affirming, or denying ; in generalitie, or ſpecialitie ; if they be affirmatiue, ſo is the concluſion ; if

negatiue, that is negatiue; if they be generall, that is generall; if they be ſpeciall, that is ſo; it is altogether like them, if they be both of the ſame kind. [d] ***Weaker part***] If either propoſition or aſſumption be particular, or negatiue, the concluſion is ſo alſo. For the ſpeciall is weaker then the generall, becauſe it is but a part of it; the negatiue weaker then the affirmatiue, becauſe it is a denying of being.

2 *There are two kinds of it. The firſt is, where the argument* [a] *alwayes followes, being* [b] *denyed in one of the parts.*

[a] *Alwayes*] Both in propoſition and aſſumption. [b] ***Denyed***] Either in the propoſition, or aſſumption; ſo that one of the parts of the antecedent muſt be negatiue.

This is *Ariſtotles* ſecond figure: the Moods of it are theſe:

CESARE, CAMESTRES, FESTINO, BAROCO.

Generall 1.

CE- *No man overcome with paſſion can vſe reaſon well.*
SA- *Every wiſe man can vſe reaſon well.*
RE. *Therefore no wiſe man is overcome with paſſion.*

This is thus concluded by *Cicero. Tuſc. quaeſt.* 3. *A mind diſquieted with paſſion, is not well fitted to doe its dutie. Now the dutie of the mind is to vſe reaſon; and the mind of a wiſe man is alwayes ſo fitted, that he can vſe reaſon well; therefore he is never diſquieted with paſſion.*

Generall 2.

CA- *He that can grieue for ſinne, as it is offenſiue to God, muſt apprehend God as reconciled and loving to him.*
MES- *No man, but he that hath faith, can apprehend God as reconciled and loving to him.*
TRES. *Therefore no man but he that hath faith, can grieue for ſinne, as it is offenſiue to God.*

No man can apprehend God as reconciled and loving to him, till he haue faith; therefore none can grieue for ſinne, as it *is offenſiue to God, till he firſt haue faith.* Helpe to happines. part. 3. quæſt. 4.

The propoſition is here wanting, the other two parts are ſet downe in expreſſe words.

Speciall 1.

FE- *None that had knowne the wiſdome of God, would haue crucified the Lord of glory.*

STI- *But the Princes of the world haue crucified the Lord of glory.*

NO. *Therefore the Princes of the world, knew not the wiſedome of God.*

Wee ſpeake the wiſedome of God in a myſtery; which none of the Princes of the world knew; for had they knowne it, they would not haue crucified the Lord of glory. 1 Cor. 2. 7. 8.

Speciall 2.

BA- *Whoſoever is of God, heareth Gods word.*

RO- *But yee heare not Gods word.*

CO. *Therefore yee are not of God.*

He that is of God, heareth Gods words; yee therfore heare them not, becauſe you are not of God. Ioh. 8. 47.

Here the propoſition is fully expreſſed. The concluſion of our Lords diſputation is manifeſt by the Text, that the *Iewes* who refuſed him for the *Meſſias*, were not of God, but of their father the Devill, *verſ.* 38 41. 44.

The aſſumption alſo is evident by the Text; wherein he findeth fault with them, for not hearing the words of God of him. The aſſumption and concluſion are put together; and the concluſion made the cauſe of the aſſumption; that they might bethinke thēſelues whence this his obedience came.

Proper 1.

Peter was not the Diſciple whom Ieſus loved.
Iohn was the Diſciple that Ieſus loved.
Therefore Iohn was not Peter.

Proper 2.

Iudas, that writ the Epiſtle, was the brother of Iames.
Iudas Iſcariot was not the brother of Iames.
Therefore Iudas Iſcariot was not he that writ the Epiſtle.

CHAP. XII.

Of the ſecond kind of a ſimple explicate ſyllogiſme.

1 *The ſecond kind of an explicate ſyllogiſme, is when the argument goeth before,* or is the ſubject, or antecedent, *in the propoſition; and followeth affirmed in the aſſumptiō,* or is the prædicate or conſequent.

This is *Ariſtotles* firſt figure: which hath theſe foure Moods:

BARBARA, CELARENT, DARII, FERIO.

Affirm: Gen:

BAR *Whoſoever is borne of God, overcommeth the world.*

BA- *Every one that beleeveth, that Ieſus Chriſt is the ſon of God, is borne of God.*

RA. *Therefore every one that beleeveth, that Ieſus Chriſt is the Sonne of God, overcommeth the world.*

1 Ioh. 5. 1. *Whoſoever beleeveth that Ieſus is the Chriſt, is borne of God.* ver. 1.

Whatſoever is borne of God, overcometh the world, and this is the victory that overcommeth the world, even our faith, ver. 4. *Who is he that overcommeth the world, but he that beleeveth that Ieſus is the Sonne of God?* verſ. 5.

Negat: Gen:

CE- *No murtherer hath æternall life abiding in him.*

LA- *Every one, that hateth his brother, is a murtherer.*

RENT. *Therefore none that hateth his brother, hath æternall life abiding in him.*

He that hateth his brother, abideth in death. Whoſoever hateth his brother is a murtherer; and ye know that no murtherer hath æternall life abiding in him. 1 Ioh. 3. 14. 15.

By this kind of reaſon, our Saviour cleares himſelfe of Blaſphemy.

Whom the Father hath ſanctified, & ſent into the world, he blaſphemeth not, becauſe he ſaith, I am the Sonne of God.

But Ieſus Chriſt is he, whom the Father hath ſanctified and ſent into the world.

Therefore he blaſphemeth not in ſaying, he is the Son of God. Ioh. 10. 36.

Ioh. 10. 36. *Say yee of him whom the Father hath ſanctified, and ſent into the world, Thou blaſphemeſt, becauſe I ſayd I am the Sonne of God?*

Affirm: ſpec:

DA- *Whomſoever God heareth, is of God, and no ſinner.*

RI- *But the Lord Ieſus Chriſt God heareth.*

I. *Therfore the Lord Ieſus Chriſt is of God, and no ſinner.*

Now we know, that God heareth not ſinners; but if any man be a worſhipper of him, and doth his will, him he heareth. If this man were not of God, he could doe nothing. Ioh. 9. 31. 33.

Negat: ſpec:

FE- *None that are borne only according to the fleſh, are the promiſed ſeede.*

RI- *But ſome of Abrahams children are borne only according to the fleſh.*

O. *Therefore ſome of Abrahams children, are not the promiſed ſeede.*

They are not all Iſrael, which are of Iſrael; Neither becauſe they are the ſeede of Abraham, are they all children; but in Iſaac ſhall thy ſeede be called; That is, they which are the children of the fleſh, are not the children of God; but the children of the promiſe are counted for the ſeede. Rom. 9. 6. 7. 8.

Affirm: Proper.

The Son of God, and the virgin Mary, is the Meſſiah.
Ieſus Chriſt is the Son of God, and the virgin Mary.
Therefore Ieſus Chriſt is the Meſſiah.

Negat: Proper.

Andrew was not brought vp at the feete of Gamaliell.
Thou art Andrew.
Therefore thou wert not brought vp at the feete of Gamaliel.

To this place alſo belong thoſe ſyllogiſmes, which conſiſt of three connexe *Axioms*: as,

If there be no reſurrection from the dead, then is our faith vaine:
But if Chriſt be not riſen againe, there

is no reſurrection of the dead.

Therefore if Chriſt be not riſen againe, our faith is vaine.

Now that this is a ſimple ſyllogiſme, and of this kind, it may appeare, by the diſpoſitiō of the third argument, which is the antecedent in the propoſition, and conſequent in the aſſumption.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the firſt connexe Syllogiſme.

1 *Hitherto of a ſimple ſyllogiſme.*

A compound ſyllogiſme is a ſyllogiſme, where the [a] *whole quæſtion is one part of the propoſition, being* [b] *affirmatiue and compound, the argument the* [c] *other part.*

This is an Hypotheticall ſyllogiſme.

[a] *The whole quæſtion*] Not onely the conſequent part thereof; as in a ſimple ſyllogiſme.

[b] *Affirmatiue*] The propoſition of a compound ſyllogiſme, muſt be compound, and affirmatiue.

[c] *Other part*] The propoſition conſiſteth of the whole quæſtion, and the argument.

To [a] *take away in a compound ſyllogiſme, is to make a ſpeciall contradiction.* 2

[a] *Take away*] It is vſed in compound ſyllogiſmes, and ſignifies as much, as gainſaying, that which you take away by a ſpeciall contradiction.

A Compound ſyllogiſme is connexe, or diſiunct. 3

A connexe is a compoūd ſyllogiſme, the propoſition whereof is connexe. And it is of two ſorts. 4

The firſt ſort of a connex ſyllogiſme, is that, which aſſumeth the antecedent, & cōcludeth the conſequent. 5 The former part or ſubject is the aſſumption; the latter part or prædicate the concluſion.

If God ſpared not the naturall branches, he will not ſpare thoſe that are not naturall. Rom. 11. 21. Examp.

But God ſpared not the naturall branches, verſ. 19.

Therefore will he not ſpare thoſe, that are not naturall. verſ. 20.21.

Thou wilt ſay then, The branches were broken off, that I might be grafted in. Be not high minded, but feare. *For if God ſpared not the naturall branches, take heed leaſt he alſo ſpare not thee.* Rom. 11. 19. 20. 21.

If ye being evill know how to giue good gifts to your children, much more ſhall your father which is in heaven, giue good things to them that aske him.

But yee being evill know how to giue good gifts to your children.

Therefore God ſhall much more giue good gifts to them that aske him.

So our Saviour Chriſt diſputes *Math.* 7. verſ. 11. the prop: verſ. 11. 10. aſſump. verſ. 7. 8. concluſion.

Of this kind is that ſyllogiſme, though not eaſily to be gathered, wherein our Lords diſputation is grounded. *Ioh.* 9. 41.

If yee were blind, you ſhould haue no ſinne; but now you ſay, we ſee, therefore your ſinne remaineth.

The diſputation lyeth thus:

If yee wittingly refuſe me the Meſſiah, yee are guiltie of grievous ſinne.

But yee wittingly refuſe me the Meſſiah.

Therefore yee are guiltie of grievous ſinne.

In ſtead of the propoſition, we haue the proofe of it. *If yee refuſed me vnwittingly, you ſhould not ſinne grievouſly; Therefore if yee refuſe me wittingly, yee ſinne grievouſly.* For the aſſumption alſo wee haue the proofe of it; namely, their owne confeſſing, or rather boaſting of their knowledge; *yee ſay we ſee*; their refuſing of our Saviour for the *Meſſiah*, is ſhewed through the whole Chapter, from verſ. 13. to 34.

Here oftentimes we aſſume not the ſame thing, but ſomewhat, that is greater. 6

As *Cicero* in *Catilin* 1. *If thy parents hated thee, and ſtood in feare of thee, ſo that thou couldeſt by no meanes ſatisfie them, I ſuppoſe thou wouldeſt convey thy ſelfe ſome whither out of their ſight:*

Now thy Countrey(which is the common Mother of vs all)*hateth and feareth thee ; and hath beene a good while perſwaded, that thou thinkeſt of nothing, but her deſtruction. Wilt thou neither reverence her authoritie ? Nor follow her adviſe ? Nor feare her power ?*

The Syllogiſme is thus framed:

If thy parents hated thee, thou oughteſt to get thee out of their ſight.

The aſſumption ſhould be ; *Thy parents hate thee*: in ſtead whereof we haue that which is greater ; *thy Countrey, the common mother of vs all, hateth thee ; Therefore thou oughteſt to get thee out of her ſight.*

Of this kind is that, *Numb.* 12. 14. *And the Lord ſayd to Moſes, if her father had ſpit in her face, ſhould ſhee not haue beene aſhamed ſeven dayes ? Let her be ſhut out of the hoſt ſeven dayes.*

The Syllogiſme lies thus:

If her father had ſpit in her face, ſhee muſt haue beene ſequeſtred from company ſeven dayes.

But now God, that is the common father of vs all, hath ſmitten her with leproſie ;

proſie; which is more then her fathers ſpitting in her face. Therefore ſhee muſt be ſhut out of the hoſt ſeven dayes.

Perhaps in theſe, and the like ſyllogiſmes, the proofe of the propoſition is put in ſtead of the propoſition it ſelfe; Thus,

If thy Countrey hate and feare thee, thou oughteſt to avoyd her preſence. For if thy parents hated and feared thee, thou oughteſt to haue done ſo; and our Country is the common mother of vs all. If God haue ſtricken her with leproſie, ſhee ought to be ſhut out ſeaven dayes; For if her father had but ſpit in her face, ſhee muſt ſo haue beene ſhut out; and God the father of vs all, hath done more then ſpit in her face.

There is the ſame manner of concluding, when the propoſition implyeth relation of time.

When Paris faire Oenone leaues,
Let Xanthus ſtreames runne to their ſourſe.
Now Paris her of loue bereaues.
Goe ſtreames runne backe againſt your courſe.

As if *Oenone* thus concluded:

If Paris forſake Oenone, Xanthus ſtreames ſhall run backe to their fountaine or ſpring.

But Paris forſaketh Oenone.

Therefore Xanthus ſtreames ſhall run backe to their fountaine or ſpring.

* * *

CHAP. XIIII.

Of the ſecond connexe Syllogiſme.

1 *The ſecond ſort of a connexe Syllogiſme, taketh away the conſequent, that it may take away the antecedent.*

If the inheritance be of the Law, it is not of promiſe.
But it is of promiſe.
Therefore it is not of the Law.

If the inheritance be of the Law, it is no more of promiſe. But God gaue it Abraham by promiſe. Gal. 3. 18.

If there had beene a Law given, that could haue given life, verily righteouſneſſe ſhould not haue beene by the Law.

But righteouſneſſe is not by the Law.
Therefore there was not a Law given that could giue life.

If there had beene a Law given, that could haue given life, verily righteouſneſſe ſhould haue beene by the Law. But the Scripture hath concluded all vnder ſinne. Gal. 3. 21. 22.

Here in ſtead of the aſſumption, we haue the proofe of it; That the Law ſhuts vp all vnder ſinne; ſo far is it from making righteous. That which maketh all men ſinners, maketh them not righteous. The concluſion in this, and the former Syllogiſme is left out; ſo in the next.

If I regard iniquitie in my heart, God would not heare me.
But God hath heard me.
Therefore I regard not iniquitie in my heart.

If I regard iniquitie in my heart, the Lord will not heare me. But verily God hath heard me, he hath attended to the voyce of my prayer. Pſal. 66. 18. 19.

Here alſo there is a concluſion vpon relation of time.

When Paris leaues to loue Oenone faire ;
Let Xanthus ſtreams back to their ſprings repaire.
But Xanthus ſtreames ſhall never back repaire :
Nor Paris leaue to loue Oenone faire.

Paris concludeth thus:

If Paris forſake Oenone, Xanthus ſtreames ſhall runne backward.

But Xanthus ſtreames ſhall never runne backward.

Therefore Paris ſhall never forſake Oenone.

3 *Theſe two kinds of Syllogiſmes, are the moſt vſuall of all.*

* * *

Chap. XV.

Of the firſt Diſjunct Syllogiſme.

1 *A diſiunct ſyllogiſme is a compound ſyllogiſme, the propoſition whereof is diſiunct*, or a diſjunct axiom.

2 *There are two ſorts. The firſt doth take away the* [a] *one, and conclude the other.*

[a] THe one] For how many ſoever the parts of the diſjunction be,

they are taken for two onely in this caſe: as,

Shall ſeven yeares of famine come unto thee in thy land? Or wilt thou flee three moneths before thine enemies, while they purſue thee? Or ſhall there be three dayes peſtilence in thy Land? And David ſaid, I am in a great ſtraight. Let us fall now into the hands of the Lord. 2 Sam. 24. 13.

Either I muſt have ſeven yeares famine, or be three moneths purſued by mine enemies, or have three dayes peſtilence.

But I will not have ſeven yeares famine, nor three moneths flight.

Therefore I will have three dayes peſtilence.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the ſecond diſjunct Syllogiſme.

The ſecond diſiunct, out of the propoſition affirmative, [a] *in all the parts,* [b] *aſſumeth one, and* [c] *taketh away the reſt.*

[a] *In all the parts*] All the parts of the propoſition muſt be affirmed, none denyed. [b] *aſſumeth* } In the aſſumption you muſt ſet downe one of the parts; whether you will, the former, or the latter.

[c] *Takes away*] In the concluſion you muſt gainſay, or contradict the reſt; Therefore the concluſion is alwayes negatiue.

This onely would I learne of you, Received yee the ſpirit by the workes of the Law, or by the hearing of faith? Are yee ſo fooliſh? Having begun in the ſpirit, are yee made perfect by the fleſh? Gal. 3. 2. 3.

Yee received the ſpirit either by the workes of the Law, or by the hearing of faith; that is, by the one of them onely, not by both. verſ. 2.

But yee received it by the hearing of faith. verſ. 3.

Therefore not by the workes of the Law.

2 *Such a ſyllogiſme is made of a copulatiue propoſition negatiue, and it hath*

hath the force of an affirmatiue diſiunction : as,

It is not both day and night; that is,
it is either day or night.
But it is day.
Therefore it is not night.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Method; which according to *Ariſtotle*, is one onely.

Method *is a diſcourſe of diverſe Axioms of the ſame kind, placed according to their manifeſtneſſe in nature; whence the agreement of them, one with another is iudged of, and committed to memory.* 1

And as in an Axiom wee looke after truth, and falſhood; in a Syllogiſme after conſequence, and inconſequence; ſo we are to haue a care in Method, that that, which is moſt plaine, be firſt ſet downe, and that, which is more obſcure, follow: and thereby indeed order, and confuſion is iudged of. 2

So among Axioms of the ſame kind, that ſhall be ſet downe in the firſt place, which is firſt abſolutely moſt cleare; that in the ſecond, which is ſecond; that in the third, which is third; and ſo forward. Therefore Method doth alwayes goe from the generalls to the particulars.

For by this onely way we goe on from things going before, which are altogether, and abſolutely eaſie to be knowne, to the declaring of thoſe things, which follow and are more vnknowne: and this onely Method did Ariſtotle *teach.*

* * *

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the firſt illuſtration of Method by the examples of Arts.

But the examples of Sciences, and Arts doe chiefly declare, and chiefly challenge this one Method.

In which though all the rules are generall, and vniverſall, yet the degrees of them are diſtinguiſhed: and how much the more generall any one ſhall be, ſo much the forwarder it ſhall be placed.

The moſt generall ſhall be firſt in place and order; becauſe it is firſt in light, and knowledge.

The middlemoſt ſhall follow; becauſe they are next in clearenes; and of thoſe, they that are moſt known by nature ſhall be ſet firſt, the leſſe knowne ſhall be ſet after.

And at the laſt the moſt ſpeciall ſhall haue their place.

Therefore the definition, which is moſt generall, ſhall be firſt. The diſtribution ſhall follow.

Which if it be manifold, the partition of it into integrall parts ſhall be firſt, then ſhall follow the diviſion of it into the ſeverall kinds.

And the very parts and kinds againe are to be handled, and defined after the ſame order, that they were diſtributed. And if the explication of them be any thing long, they are to be tyed together by bands of tranſition: for this doth refreſh and cheare the Auditour.

And that the thing may be the more familiarly conceived, we muſt vſe a familiar example. Let all the definitions, diſtributions, and rules of Grammar be found out; and every one ſeverally indged of: and let all theſe inſtructions be written in ſeverall peices, and let them be ſhaked and toſſed up and downe altogether in a pot, as we vſe to doe in a Lottery: here if you would ſeeke what part of Logick ſhould teach you to diſpoſe, and ſet in order theſe rules ſo confuſedly mingled together: firſt, there is no neede of the places of Invention, ſeing all are already found out: neither of the firſt iudgement of an Axiom, ſeing every Axiom is proved and allowed: neither is there any need of the ſecond iudgment, by a ſyllogiſme, ſeing all controverſies about every particular thing haue beene diſcuſſed, and concluded: onely Method remaineth. A Logician therefore, by the ſight of artificiall Method, will gather out of this pot, the definition of Grammar (for that is the moſt generall) and ſet it in the firſt place: Grammar is an Art of ſpeaking well. Then he will looke in the ſame pot for a partition of Grammar, and ſet it in the ſecond place: There are two parts of Grammar, Etymologie and Syntaxe. *Thirdly, he will gather out of the ſame pot, the definition of* Etymologie *concerning words, and will ioyne it to that which went before in the third place. Fourthly, he will looke out the definition of a word; letters and ſyllables; and the kindes of it, words with number; and without number; and will ſet tranſitions at the ends, in their due places. And ſo he will ſet in order the definitions of all the parts of* Etymologie, *the diſtributions, ioynings of one to another, laſt of all, the moſt ſpeciall examples in every particular. And the ſame will be doe in* Syntaxis. *This courſe haue all Arts appointed for themſelues.*

Chap. XIX.

Of the ſecond illuſtration of Method, by the examples of *Poëts*, *Oratours*, and *Hiſtoriographers*.

BVt *Method is not onely vſed in the matter of Arts and Sciences, but in all*

all things, which wee will eaſily and clearely teach.

Therefore Poëts and Oratours, and generally all Writers, as often as they take vpon them, to teach their auditour, will follow this courſe, though they doe not altogether keepe themſelues to it.

Examp. Examples of this we haue in every Sermon; and in every booke, that is orderly written. So *Chaucer* in *Troïlus* divides his *Poëm* into two parts: his change from griefe to joy, and then againe from joy to griefe: the former in the three former bookes: the latter in the two latter.

The double ſorrow of Troïlus to tellen,
That was King Priamus *ſonne of Troy;*
In loving how his adventures fellen,
From woe to weale and after out of Ioy;
My purpoſe is, ere that I part from yee.

It is my purpoſe before I leaue you, to tell the double adventures of *Troïlus* in his loue,

In the third Booke he comes to the other part.

—— How Creſide Troïlus forſooke;
Or at the leaſt, how that ſhe was vnkind;
Muſt hence-forth be the matter of my
(Booke.

In the Bookes following, I muſt ſhew how *Creſide* forſooke *Troïlus*.

Oratours affect this order, in their Præface, Narration, Confirmation, and Peroration, and they call it the order of Art, of nature, and of the thing it ſelfe: and ſometime they doe very diligently follow it.

* * *

CHAP. XX.

Of the hiding of *Method*.

THIS *therefore ſhall be the Method in diverſe Axioms of the ſame kind, which are knowne either by their owne, or ſyllogiſticall iudgement, as often as any thing is clearely to be taught.* 3

But when we will after any ſort deceiue our Auditour with delight, or any ſtronger motion, ſome homogeneall axi- 2

oms

ones ſhall be caſt away, as the lights of definitions, partitions, and tranſitions; ſome heterogeneall axioms ſhall be uſed, as digreſſion from the matter, and long ſtayings on it; but eſpecially the order of things in the beginning ſhall be changed: and ſome things that ſhould goe before, ſhall be ſet after them, that ſhould follow.

Therefore in compariſon of that rule of perfect Method, this forme ſome where vnperfect, is not onely lame, by reaſon of ſome things that are left out, or abounding with ſuperfluous things, but alſo præpoſterous in order, by reaſon that certaine parts of the matter are miſplaced.

Which the Poet doth with a kind of the greater ſhew of Art, when he purpoſeth to lead or perſwade the people, which is a beaſt with many heads: he therefore deceiveth them many wayes: he beginneth with the middle, and therein oftentimes comprehendeth the beginning; laſt of all, he concludes with ſome vncertaine and vnlooked-for event. So doth *Heliodorus* in his *Æthiopian Hiſtory* of *Theagenes*, & *Cariclœa*. So Sir *Philip Sidney* in his *Arcadia*.

So comicall Poets, though they diſtinguiſh their Comedies into Acts and Scaenes, with great iudgement; yet they make all things ſeeme to happen by chance.

The Oratours referre all to victory; that they may overcome thoſe, againſt whom they pleade. Therefore (not ſo much to inſtruct as to moue) that which is ſtrongeſt, is alwayes placed firſt by them; yet ſo that thoſe things which are as excellent, are kept for the laſt place, and thoſe that are but ſo ſo, are thruſt into the middle of the Troupe and Battayle.

⁂

FINIS.